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"The expression 'welljounded fear' is not a precise one; in particular, 
it invites debate as to the extent to which the fear depends upon objec-
tive facts and the extent to which it reflects the subjective state ef the 
person concerned. "
1 
Linguistic ambiguity in the refugee definition's requirement of 
"well-founded fear" of being persecuted2 has given rise to a wide range 
of interpretations. There is general agreement that a fear is "well-
founded" only if the refugee claimant faces an actual, forward-looking 
risk of being persecuted in her country of origin (the "objective ele-
ment"). But it is less clear whether the well-founded "fear" standard also 
requires a showing that the applicant is not only genuinely at risk, but 
also stands in trepidation of being persecuted.3 
Beyond vague references to the subjective quality of "fear," few 
courts or commentators have undertaken the task of explaining what jus-
tifies recognition of a subjective element in the first place. What, in the 
end, does subjective fear or trepidation have to do with the goals of refu-
gee law? Reasoned explanations are in short supply. This shortfall in 
critical thinking has greatly complicated efforts to formulate a coherent 
understanding of the subjective element, and clearly to articulate its role 
in the analysis of well-founded fear. 
Semantic difficulties add an additional layer of complexity to the 
debate. Discussions related to the subjective element frequently resort to 
indefinite language, itself susceptible to multiple interpretations. This 
confusion is evident, for example, in the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugee's (UNHCR) Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
I. Chan v. Minister for Immigr. and Ethnic Aff., [1989] 169 C.L.R. 379, 405 (Aust!. 
1989) (Toohey J.). 
2. Under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees the term "refugee" 
applies 
to any person who ... [a]s a result of events occurring before I January 1951 and 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his formal habitual residence as a result of such events, is un-
able or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951, art. l(A)(2), 189 
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. The 1967 Protocol inter alia removed the 
Convention's temporal limitations, omitting the words "[a]s a result of events occurring before 
I January 1951 and ... " and the words "as a result of such events." Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1(2), 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
3. From a strictly textual perspective, this interpretation is understandable. On one 
reading, "fear" connotes "[t]he emotion of pain or uneasiness caused by the sense of impend-
ing danger .... " 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 780 (2d ed. 1989). 
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for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR Handbook),4 
which contains passages that support almost every imaginable under-
standing of the subjective element.5 Because non-textual justifications 
for the subjective element are few and far between, the proliferation of 
discrete understandings has been unconstrained by policy-driven reason-
mg. 
In contrast to prevailing views, we take the position that there is no 
subjective element in the well-founded fear standard. The Convention 
definition's reference to "fear" was intended simply to mandate an indi-
viduated, forward-looking appraisal of actual risk,6 "not to require an 
examination of the emotional reaction of the claimant."7 Rather than 
predicating access to protection on the existence of "fear" in the sense of 
trepidation, the Convention refugee definition requires only the demon-
stration of "fear" in the sense of a forward-looking expectation of risk. 
Once fear so conceived is voiced by the act of seeking protection, it falls 
to the state party assessing refugee status to determine whether that ex-
pectation is borne out by the actual circumstances of the case. If it is, the 
applicant's fear (that is, his or her expectation) of being persecuted 
should be adjudged well-founded. Grahl-Madsen rightly observed that 
"[e]very person claiming ... to be a refugee has 'fear' ('well-founded' or 
otherwise) of being persecuted ... irrespective of whether he jitters at 
the very thought of his return to his home country, is prepared to brave 
all hazards, or is simply apathetic or even unconscious of the possible 
dangers."8 
This understanding of "fear" as forward-looking expectation of risk is 
fully justified by one of its plain meanings. While "fear" is most 
commonly understood in the sense of trepidation, the term may also be 
defined as "a particular apprehension of some future evil . . . (an) 
[a]pprehensive feeling towards anything regarded as a source of danger, or 
towards a person regarded as able to inflict injury or punishment."9 
4. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES 
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 
1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, U.N. Doc. HCP/IP/4/Eng/REV.l 
(1979, reedited l 992)[hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK]. 
5. See, for instance, the confusing and seemingly contradictory positions taken in the 
UNHCR Handbook at 'll'll 37-42, 52. 
6. Refugee Appeal No. 71404/99 (Refugee Status Appeals Auth. 1999) (Haines, Dep-
uty Chair) (N.Z.) ("[T]he inquiry into refugee status is concerned only with the prospective 
assessment of the risk of persecution."). 
7. See JAMES c. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 67 (1991) ("The concept 
of well-founded fear is rather inherently objective .... "). 
8. ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 174 
(1966). 
9. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 780. 
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Understood in this sense, "fear" merely denotes the refugee's expectation 
of impending persecution. This understanding is consistent with a 
common usage of "fear" in standard English, as in expressions such as: 
"I fear you are mistaken," "I fear I have bad news for you," "I fear it may 
come to that," and "I fear I won't be able to make it to the party." It is 
also noteworthy that the verb "craindre," as used in the equally 
authoritative French language version of the Refugee Convention, 10 like 
"fear"-its English language equivalent"-can be interpreted either in 
the sense of expectation or trepidation. 12 
The determination of whether an applicant's "fear" (in the sense of 
forward-looking expectation of risk) is, or is not, "well-founded" is thus 
purely evidentiary in nature. It requires the state party assessing refugee 
status to determine whether there is a significant risk that the applicant 
may be persecuted. While the mere chance or remote possibility of being 
persecuted is insufficient to establish a well-founded fear, the applicant 
need not show that there is a clear probability that he or she will be per-
secuted. Only a "real chance" or "reasonable possibility" of being 
persecuted needs to be demonstrated. 13 
Because the sole focus of the well-founded fear inquiry is the as-
sessment of an applicant's individuated risk of being persecuted, and 
because all evidence relevant to that risk can be considered without a 
10. The French version of the Refugee Convention at Article l(A)(2) reads: 
Aux fins de Ia presente Convention, le terme « refugie » s'appliquera a toute per-
sonne ... [q]ui, par suite d'evenements survenus avant le premier janvier 1951 et 
craignant avec raison d'etre persecutee du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa na-
tionalire, de son appartenance a un certain groupe social ou de ses opinions 
politiques, se trouve hors du pays dont elle a la nationalite et qui ne peut ou, du fait 
de cette crainte, ne veut se reclamer de la protection de ce pays ; ou qui, si elle n'a 
pas de nationalite et se trouve hors du pays dans Iequel elle avait sa residence habi-
tuelle a la suite de tels evenements, ne peut ou, en raison de ladite crainte, ne veut y 
retoumer .. 
Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. l(A)(2). 
11. "Craignant avec raison" is the French language equivalent of"well-founded fear." 
12. "Craindre" may be used in the sense of "apprehender," as in expressions such as: "II 
ne viendra pas, je le crains"; "Ne craignez rien"; "Yous n'avez rien a craindre"; "II est a 
crainte que cet eleve n'echoue a !'examen"; and "II y a lieu de craindre qu'un orage se pre-
pare." See 3 LE GRAND ROBERT DE LA LAN GUE FRANC¥AISE: DICTIONNAIRE ALPHABETIQUE ET 
ANALOGIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANCAISE 11 (Alain Rey ed., 2d ed. 1985). 
13. See, e.g., INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 425 (1987) (requiring a "reasonable possibil-
ity" of being persecuted); R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Sivakumaran, 
[1988] A.C. 958 (H.L. 1988) (U.K.) (setting the standard as a "reasonable degree of likeli-
hood"); and Chan v. Minister for lmmigr. and Ethnic Aff., [1989] 169 C.L.R. 379, 507 (Austl. 
1989) (Toohey, J.) (requiring a "real chance" as distinguished from a "remote" chance of be-
ing persecuted). The relevant question is thus effectively " ... whether a reasonable person in 
the asylum applicant's circumstances would fear persecution .... " Morales v. INS, 208 F.3d 
323, 330 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Aguilar-Solaris v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
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subjective element, we maintain that continued reference to distinct sub-
jective and objective elements of the well-founded fear standard is 
unhelpful. Indeed, persistent references in the jurisprudence and schol-
arly literature to such abstract concepts as objectivity and subjectivity are 
at least partly responsible for the conceptual confusion that, to this point, 
has frustrated the emergence of a shared understanding of the well-
founded fear standard. The analysis that follows elaborates our argument 
that there is no subjective element in "well-founded fear." For the sake of 
clarity, we avoid resort to the misleading labels ("objective" and "subjec-
tive") traditionally associated with the well-founded fear inquiry. 
In section I, we set out our view that the traditional bipartite ap-
proach to "well-founded fear" is unjustified as a matter of principle and 
also impossible practically to implement in a fair and consistent manner. 
In particular, there is simply no principled way for decisionrnakers to 
evaluate an applicant's state of mind for evidence of trepidation. Because 
of the consequent need to rely on largely artificial, surrogate indicators 
of trepidation, the bipartite approach as applied results in the denial of 
refug~e status to persons who face the risk of being persecuted in their 
country of origin, some of whom may, in fact, be fearful. Even when a 
more seemingly benign approach to the subjective element is adopted-
with evidence of trepidation considered only as a means of "topping up" 
a claim that is insufficiently established on objective grounds-a real 
injustice is still likely to occur. Under such an approach, persons whose 
fear is readily recognized as such by decisionmakers, as well as those 
who are simply more demonstrative, will be advantaged in securing 
refugee status for reasons that have nothing to do with the actual risk 
faced. 
In section II, we suggest that the protection risks associated with the 
bipartite test, as well as the fairness concerns raised by use of trepidation 
as an essential element or as a "plus factor," can both be avoided by in-
terpreting "fear" in its alternative sense of forward-looking expectation. 
We argue moreover that this linguistically sound interpretation is sup-
ported by the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention, and is 
confirmed by state practice under the equally authoritative French lan-
guage version of the refugee definition. An interpretation of "fear" as 
forward-looking expectation of risk is also more consistent with the in-
ternal structure of the Refugee Convention, in particular with the 
approach taken in Articles l(C)(5-6) and 33. 
In section III, we demonstrate that an understanding of "well-
founded fear" that focuses exclusively on actual risk in no way 
undermines the critical importance of conducting a particularized inquiry 
into risk. All evidence relevant to a given applicant's actual risk of being 
persecuted-including his or her testimony and other individuated 
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evidence-is admissible for the purpose of establishing a "well-founded 
fear." This is true whether evidence unique to the applicant is treated as 
part of a subjective inquiry, an objective inquiry, or simply the inquiry 
into actual risk. If, in contrast, the goal of the subjective element is not 
just to secure admission of an applicant's evidence, but instead to require 
that it be given categorical priority over all other evidence of risk, we 
argue that it should be rejected as inconsistent with the responsibility of 
the decisionmaker to assign weight to each piece of evidence solely as a 
function of its real probative worth. If, on the other hand, the rationale 
for maintenance of a subjective element is the need to take account of 
evidence of an applicant's particular physical or psychological traits that 
result in subjection to harm greater than that experienced by other 
persons, then the subjective element is superfluous. These types of 
vulnerabilities can, and should, be considered as part of the analysis of 
whether the anticipated harm rises to the level of "being persecuted," and 
without regard to a subjective element. 
I. CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACHES 
The dominant view worldwide is that the test for well-founded fear 
is comprised of two essential elements. This bipartite approach requires 
the applicant to demonstrate a significant, actual risk of being persecuted 
("objective element") as well as an emotional state of trepidation with 
respect to that risk("subjective element"). A second approach with some 
support in current practice treats subjective fear not as an essential ele-
ment of refugee status, but rather as a "top-up" factor which may be 
relied upon to grant refugee status to a person who has failed to show a 
significant actual risk of being persecuted. 
A. Fear as One of Two Essential Elements: 
The Bipartite Approach 
While there is some support for a more extreme position-namely, 
that the applicant's trepidation is the primary,14 or even the exclusive,15 
focus of analysis-most courts require evidence of objective risk as well, 
14. "That the fear must be 'well-founded' does not alter the obvious focus on the individ-
ual's subjective beliefs .... " INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987). Lower courts, 
however, have generally required a demonstration of significant risk as well as subjective fear as 
a prerequisite to refugee status. 
15. Theodore N. Cox, Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted: The Sources and Applica-
tion of a Criterion of Refugee Status, 10 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 333, 349 (1984) ("The focus of 
inquiry [under the Refugee Convention] is directed towards a person's actual fear and his real and 
natural motivation for desiring protection .... [l]f a person's fear is enough to make him flee, it is 
well-founded"); See also R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex pane Sivakumaran, [1988] 
A.C. 958, 991 (H.L. 1987) (Keith, L.J.) (U.K.) quoting the analysis of Sir John Donaldson in the 
Court of Appeal at [1987] 3 W.L.R 1047, 1052-1053. The House of Lords rejected this approach. 
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and therefore decline to find that trepidation alone is sufficient to engage 
the Convention obligations of States. Under this bipartite approach there 
are two essential elements, each of which must be proved: a finding of 
objective risk, and a determination of subjective fear or trepidation. 
The articulation of the well-founded fear standard in the UNHCR 
Handbook offers clear support for the bipartite approach: 
To the element of fear-a state of mind and a subjective condi-
tion-is added the qualification "well-founded." This implies 
that it is not only the frame of mind of the person concerned that 
determines his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must 
be supported by an objective situation. The term "well-founded 
fear" therefore contains a subjective and an objective element. 16 
The UNHCR position has been adopted by leading courts with only 
slight modification. The High Court of Australia, for instance, has noted that 
the well-founded fear standard "has both subjective and objective elements 
and necessitates consideration of the mental and emotional state of the indi-
vidual and, also, the objective facts relating to the conditions in the country 
of his or her nationality."11 Most senior courts of the common law world-
including the House of Lords, 18 United States Supreme Court/9 Supreme 
Court of Canada, 20 and Irish High Court21-have taken the same position.22 
Despite its wide following, there is increasing recognition that the 
bipartite approach poses protection risks that are incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the Refugee Convention. Most significantly, the 
16. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, '1138. 
17. Re Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., Ex pane Miah, [2001] H.C.A. 22, '1162 
(Aust!. 2001) (Gaudron, J.). 
18. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. Ex vane Sivakumaran. f!9881 A.C. 958. 
1000 (H.L. 1988) (Goff. L.) (U.K.) ("fTlhe expression 'well-founded' ... cannot be read simply 
as 'aualifying' the subjective fear of the applicant-it must. in my opinion reauire that an inquiry 
should be made whether the subjective fear of the applicant is objectively justified."). 
19. The U.S. Supreme Court-while declining to elaborate a detailed test for "well-
founded fear"-has clearly indicated that the standard is comprised of both objective and subjec-
tive elements. Regarding the objective element, the Court has noted that an actual risk of 
persecution is required, though "[o]ne can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happen-
ing when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. at 431. But the standard is not exclusively objective, according to the Court, because "the 
reference to 'fear' ... obviously makes the eligibility determination tum to some extent on the 
subjective mental state of the alien." Id. at 430-31. 
20. "Both the existence of the subjective fear and the fact that the fear is objectively well-
founded must be established on a balance of probabilities." Chan v. Can. (Minister of Employ-
ment and Immigr.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593, '11120 (Can. 1995). 
21. Zgnat'ev v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, [2001] I.E.H.C. 70 (Ir. H. 
Ct. 2001) ("[F]ear must be well founded and this implies that the applicant's frame of mind must 
be supported by an objective situation. The phrase therefore contains a subjective and an objec-
tive element.") (referencing UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, '1138 ). 
22. There is some minimal support for the bipartite approach in civil law jurisdictions as 
well. See, e.g., Up-78/00 (Constitutional Ct. 2000) .(Slovn.), available at http://www.us-
rs.si/en/index.php?sv _path=9. 
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bipartite approach can lead to denial of refugee status to at-risk appli-
cants who either are not fearful, or whose trepidation is not identified as 
such by decisionmakers. This concern arises most obviously in the as-
sessment of refugee claims made by children and mentally disabled 
persons, who may be unable to experience or to articulate the requisite 
emotional state. Most courts have been sensitive to such cases, and have 
exempted children and mentally disabled persons from the duty to dem-
onstrate trepidation as a precondition for refugee status. There are 
serious practical challenges to identifying precisely when a lack of ca-
pacity exists, however, such that dispensation from the usual approach to 
"well-founded fear" is warranted. There are moreover other categories of 
persons not encompassed by presently recognized exceptions who face 
comparable dilemmas in satisfying the subjective prong of the two-part 
test. The extraordinary diversity among applicants in terms of culture, 
language, and temperament (which may or may not be impacted by prior 
incidents of persecution) makes it difficult, at times impossible, for deci-
sionmakers reliably to detect the presence of trepidation, even under the 
best of circumstances. 
Perhaps with these concerns in mind, Grahl-Madsen observed: 
The adjective "well-founded" suggests that it is not the frame of 
mind of the person concerned which is decisive for his claim to 
refugeehood, but that his claim should be measured with a more 
objective yardstick .... In fact ... the frame of mind of the indi-
vidual hardly matters at all. 23 
In line with this understanding, Kalin has noted that "[d]uring the 
last decades, a trend has developed to put the main emphasis on the 
objective elements."24 For example, the House of Lords observed in Adan 
that "(t]he use of the term 'fear' was intended to emphasize the forward-
looking nature of the test, and not to ground refugee status in an 
assessment of the refugee claimant's state of rnind."25 Similarly, the New 
Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority has held that "the bipartite 
23. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 8, at 174. 
24. Walter Kiilin, Well-Founded Fear of Persecution: A European Perspective, in ASY-
LUM LAW AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 21, 28 
(Jacqueline Bhabha & Geoffrey Coll eds., 1992) (However, because he believes that psycho-
logical suffering is often not appropriately validated as part of the "objective" inquiry and that 
"freedom from fear is a value in itself," Kiilin hopes that "states, without neglecting objective 
factors, would take subjective factors more into account. ... " An evaluation of the "subjective 
element" (in the sense of evidence of particularized vulnerability), he argues, will lead to an 
increase in the grants of refugee status, furthering the humanitarian aims of the Refugee Con-
vention.) 
25. Adan v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1999] 1 A.C. 293, 307 (H.L. 1998) 
(Lloyd L.J.) (U.K.) (quoting JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 69 (1991)). 
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test may have outlived its usefulness. It might even on occasion lead to a 
material misdirection as to the nature of the objective component of the 
refugee definition."26 Commentators have expressed similar sentiments. 27 
Despite the ever-increasing awareness of the real protection risks as-
sociated with the duty to show subjective fear in order to establish a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted, many courts and commentators 
have nonetheless resisted the notion that well-founded fear does not in-
volve a subjective element of some kind, perhaps because of the 
perceived imperative of the "fear" language, or simply because subjec-
tivity has traditionally been assumed to be relevant to qualification as a 
refugee. Some courts have reconciled these competing imperatives by 
adopting mechanisms which effectively eviscerate the subjective element 
of any substantive role in the well-founded fear inquiry, but without for-
mally disavowing the legitimacy of the bipartite test or the duty to 
demonstrate trepidation. For instance, the existence of trepidation may 
be inferred whenever it is determined that an applicant faces a significant 
risk of being persecuted in his or her country of origin.28 Other courts for-
mally adhering to the bipartite test marginalize the subjective element by 
simply declining to perform an analysis of the applicant's emotional 
state.29 Although these approaches may minimize the risks associated with 
a rigorous inquiry into the subjective element, it seems intellectually dis-
honest to apply one standard while purporting to apply another. Moreover, 
because these approaches do not provide a satisfying justification for 
26. See, e.g., Refugee Appeal No. 70074/96, Re ELLM (Refugee Status Appeals Auth. 
1996) (Haines, Deputy Chair) (N.Z.). 
27. Jean-Yves Carlier, General Report, in WHO IS A REFUGEE? COMPARATIVE CASE 
LAW STUDY 697 (Jean-Yves Curlier et al. eds., 1997) ("A detailed examination of the subjec-
tive element does not seem necessary when evaluating the risk of persecution."); HATHAWAY, 
supra note 7, at 67. 
28. See Savchenkov v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, No. 11513, HX/71698/94 
(Immigr. App. Trib. 1994) (unpublished) (U.K.) (on file with author). ("The plausibility of the 
risk objectively assessed will be relevant to (and may dictate) whether or not the appellant is 
believed to have a fear of risk."); Adjei v. Minister of Employment and Immigr., [ 1989] 2 F.C. 
680, 'Il 4 (Fed. Ct. App. 1989) (MacGuigan, J.) (Can.) ("In light of the uncontradicted evidence 
... as to [the] objective basis for such fear, the Board's reluctance to acknowledge even the 
applicant's subjective fear reads strangely."); Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 890--91 (9th Cir. 
2001) ("Because the strong evidence as to the objective component of a 'well-founded fear of 
persecution' claim is therefore relevant in establishing petitioner's subjective fear, to the extent 
that any question exists with respect to the genuineness of petitioner's fear, it is answered by 
our decision regarding the objective component.") (quoting Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 
1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
29. See Thompson v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, No. 18848, HX/78032/1996 
(Immigr. App. Trib. 1998) (unpublished) (U.K.). ("The occasions upon which it would ever be 
necessary to decide whether a claimant does actually have an apprehension would, we have 
thought, be rare."); Yusuf v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), [1992]1 F.C. 629 
(Fed. Ct. App. 1992) (Can.) ("I find it hard to see in what circumstances it could be said that a 
person who, we must not forget, in by definition claiming refugee status could be right in 
fearing persecution and still be rejected because it is said that fear does not actually exist in his 
conscience."). 
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bypassing the inquiry into an applicant's state of mind, the formalistic 
retention of the subjective element leaves open the possibility that judi-
cial decisions will be misunderstood and misapplied. 
1. The Risk of Unwarranted Denials of Protection 
Because the bipartite approach posits the existence of two essential 
elements, it necessarily follows that refugee status must be denied where 
an applicant fails to establish that he or she is subjectively fearful. The 
simple logic of this observation has not been lost on courts. The Cana-
dian Federal Court Trial Division, for instance, noted that "[t]he lack of 
evidence going to the subjective element of the claim is a fatal flaw 
which in and of itself warrants dismissal of the claim, because both ele-
ments of the refugee definition-subjective and objective-must be 
met."30 Similarly, the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 
"[i]f an objective basis is shown, the applicant must then show his sub-
jective fear is genuine."31 
The inescapable, and deeply unsatisfying, consequence of the insis-
tence on proof of trepidation is that an applicant found not to be fearful 
must be denied refugee status, despite a finding that he or she faces a 
real chance of being persecuted if returned to the country of origin. Al-
though seemingly improbable, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to 
have offered a chilling endorsement of this very result. In considering 
the case of a Chinese national who had fathered two children in violation 
of China's "one child policy" and who therefore risked forcible steriliza-
tion, Mr. Justice Major observed: 
[T]he evidence of the appellant with respect to his subjective 
fear of forced sterilization is equivocal at best. However, in the 
absence of an explicit finding by the Board on this point, it 
would not be appropriate for this Court to determine that the ap-
pellant did not have a subjective fear of forced sterilization.32 
In other words, a negative finding with respect to the applicant's subjec-
tive fear of forced sterilization would have constituted valid grounds for 
denying refugee status. 
30. Kamana v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 5998-98, 'JI I 0 (Fed. 
Ct. Trial Div. 1999) (Tremblay-Lamar J.) (Can.). See also Maqdassy v. Can. (Minister of Citi-
zenship and lmmigr.), [2002) F.C.T. 182, 'JI 10 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 2002) (Tremblay-Lamer, J.) 
(Can.) ("[T]he lack of evidence going to the subjective element of the claim is in itself suffi-
cient for the applicant's claim to fail."). 
31. Nasir v. INS, 30 Fed. Appx. 812, 814 (10th Cir. 2002) (Briscoe, J.). 
32. Chan v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), [1995) 3 S.C.R. 663, 'JI 132 
(Can. 1995) (Major, J.). 
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The High Court of Australia has similarly held that even those appli-
cants facing a significant risk of being persecuted are properly denied 
status where found to lack the required trepidation. In Chan,33 the Court 
found that the first instance tribunal had erred in determining that the 
applicant, who had suffered past persecution, did not face a significant 
prospective risk of being persecuted. In returning the case for further 
consideration, the Court instructed: 
If the material before the delegate showed the applicant to be ex-
traordinarily brave or foolhardy it might reasonably be found 
that his persecution engendered no fear. But if it were accepted 
that [his past persecution] engendered a fear of being persecuted 
then it would be unreasonable to characterize that fear as other 
than well-founded ... On that latter basis, Mr. Chan's claim to a 
well-founded fear of persecution if returned to China might rea-
sonably be rejected if it were found that he no longer held ihat 
fear. 34 
To make matters worse, when refusing claims for lack of fear, first 
instance decisionmakers commonly treat trepidation as a threshold re-
quirement that must be satisfied before an inquiry into risk is even 
undertaken.35 In this way, at-risk applicants can be denied protection 
without so much as an acknowledgment of their plight. In Thuraisamy,36 
the Full Federal Court of Australia expressly sanctioned this approach: 
[I]t is important to note that, at this stage of his reasoning, the 
Tribunal member was not addressing issues such as the cause of 
any fear of persecution-that is, whether it stemmed from a 
33. Chan v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [1989] 169 C.L.R. 379 (Aust!. 
1989). 
34. Id. (emphasis added). 
35. Naremanov v. Refugee Status Appeals Auth., CP 354/98, 'l[ 32 (H.C. 2000) (unpub-
lished) (Gendall, J.) (N.Z) (on file with author) ("[T]he applicant for refugee status must 
establish that there is firstly actual fear of return to a country for a Convention reason, that 
being an actual subjective element, and, secondly that objectively the fear is justified."), avail-
able at http://www.refugee.org.nz/Casesearch/HighCourt/nvrsaa.htrnl.; Maqdassy v. Can. 
(Minister of Citizenship and lmmigr.), [2002) F.C.T. 182 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 2002) (Can.) 
(denying refugee status based on lack of subjective fear without consideration of objective 
evidence of risk); Farah v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), 1999 F.T.R. 161, 'l[ 24 
(Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1999) (Blais J.) (Can.) ("By failing to demonstrate that she had a subjec-
tive fear of persecution, the applicant failed to meet the test established by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Ward, so the panel had no obligation to go further."); Refugee Appeal No. 1191, 
Re TLY, and 2/91, Re LAB (Refugee Status Appeals Auth. 1991) (Nicholson, Chairman) 
(N.Z.) (stating that the fear must be ascertained first, and only then can it be asked whether the 
fear is well-founded), available at http://www.refugee.org.nz/rsaa/text/docs/l-91.htm. 
36. Thuraisamy v. Minister for lmmigr. and Multicultural Aff., [1999] F.C.A. 1632 
(Full Fed. Ct. 1999) (Aust!.). 
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matter referred to in the Convention definition ... The Tribunal 
was concerned, at this stage, simply with the question whether 
or not the fear existed. If it answered that question adversely to 
the applicant's claim, as it did, that was the end of the matter.37 
Similarly, the Canadian Federal Court Trial Division has found that 
"lack of subjective fear constitutes a critical barrier to a refugee claim 
which, on its own, justifies non-recognition."38 Moreover, because re-
viewing courts typically accord great deference to the impressions of 
first instance decisionmakers in matters related to demeanor, credibility, 
and veracity, applicants found not to be subjectively fearful (and without 
consideration of actual risk) are unlikely to receive meaningful appellate 
• 39 review. 
Paradoxically, the subjective fear requirement can even impair an 
applicant's prospects for obtaining a favorable result on review where his 
or her claim was originally rejected for lack of objective risk. For exam-
ple, in the Australian Federal Court case of Suleiman40 the first level 
tribunal denied refugee status on the grounds that applicant did not face 
an objective risk of being persecuted for reasons of his political activi-
ties. The claim on review was that the tribunal erred in failing to 
consider all relevant evidence, including that which indicated a risk of 
being persecuted because of his membership in a particular social group. 
Noting that the tribunal had not considered all evidence pertinent to the 
applicant's membership in the relevant social group, the Federal Court 
nevertheless upheld the denial of refugee status: 
[I]t is necessary not merely that there be objectively a fear of 
persecution by reason of membership of a particular social 
group, but that the applicant actually had that fear. It is hard to 
imagine how the question of the existence of a particular social 
37. Id. 'II 8. 
38. Anandasivam v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM-4748-00, 'II 23 
(Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 2001) (Lemieux, J.) (Can.). 
39. This is especially true in the United States. See, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 
252 n.23 (3rd Cir. 2003) ("We note that the IJ did not rely on her personal observations of 
Dia's demeanor or any other observations to which we must accord an even greater degree of 
deference."); Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 662 (9th Cir. 2003) ("fW]e grant 
special deference to the IJ's eyewitness observations regarding demeanor evidence."); 
Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 487 (!st Cir. 1994) ("[C]redibility findings resting on 
analysis of testimony rather than on demeanor may 'deserve less than usual deference.'") 
(quoting Consolidation Coal v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1982)). See also R. v. 
Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex pane Sourbah, (1999] Imm. A.R. 452 (Q.B. 1999) 
(Eng.) (deferring to the special adjudicator's findings regarding credibility and subjective 
fear). 
40. Suleiman v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., (2001] F.C.A. 752 (Full 
Fed. Ct. 2001) (Austl.). 
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group could arise unless there is some evidence that the appli-
cant ... had a subjective fear of persecution on the grounds of 
membership of that social group.41 
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In this case, the failure of the applicant to voice his subjective fear of 
being persecuted on the grounds of social group membership effectively 
excused the tribunal from considering evidence indicative of his risk of 
persecution for that particular Convention reason. This result is all the 
more remarkable given that the tribunal never made a specific finding as 
to the applicant's subjective fear. 
As the Suleiman discussion illustrates, the bipartite approach, by its 
very nature, admits of the possibility that genuinely at-risk persons will 
be denied refugee status. Consequently, the subjective element cannot be 
viewed as a mere benign accessory to a well-founded fear inquiry fun-
damentally concerned with risk. In stealth, it can deny international 
protection to persons who are clearly in need of it. 
2. The Challenge of Implementation 
The normative concerns raised by the bipartite approach are more-
over exacerbated by the inherent practical challenges associated with 
implementation. Assuming arguendo that it comports with the goals of 
refugee law to deny protection to at-risk individuals who, for whatever 
reason, are not subjectively fearful, the fundamental illogic of insistence 
on proof of trepidation is exposed by the fact that it is generally difficult, 
if not impossible, for decisionmakers to determine in a formal hearing 
process whether an applicant is genuinely fearful or not. 
The bipartite approach clearly assumes the ability of decisionmakers 
accurately and reliably to ascertain whether an applicant is subjectively 
fearful. The crude investigative tools available to decisionmakers, how-
ever, are often ill-suited to unraveling the mysteries of an applicant's 
psyche. The analysis of a person's emotional state-an inherently prob-
lematic exercise even in the best of circumstances-is especially difficult 
in the context of refugee law.42 Indeed, the subjective fear inquiry is so 
difficult and fraught with uncertainty that erroneous determinations are 
virtually assured. This is especially true where an effort is made to assess 
subjective fear based on an applicant's outward demeanor and the con-
tent of his or her testimony. 
41. Id. 'l!'ll 15-16. 
42. See Andjongo v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, No. 12341, HX 7491/94 (lm-
migr. App. Trib. 1995) (U.K.) ("Assuming for the moment that it is a correct statement of law 
that the subjective element in the claim for refugee status is the presence of actual fear, be-
cause it is a state of mind and exceedingly difficult to contradict, it will be rare indeed for a 
finding to be made that it did not exist."). 
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One factor complicating the inquiry is the considerable diversity 
among applicants. Persons of "different nationalities, educations, trades, 
experience, creeds and temperaments" are bound to manifest fears in 
divergent and unpredictable ways.43 In particular, persons whose culture 
discourages the open display of emotion may present an outwardly stoic 
demeanor, despite intense, internal feelings of distress and anxiety. Such 
persons are therefore especially likely to be denied refugee status for 
failure to demonstrate a subjective fear of being persecuted (regardless 
of their actual risk). As Adjin-Tettey has argued, some applicants "may 
not appear 'fearful enough' for refugee decisionmakers measuring emo-
tional reaction against a Western male standard,"44 with the result that 
they could be excluded "from international protection even though they 
may have an objectively strong case."45 She contends that the duty to 
demonstrate trepidation particularly disadvantages women required to 
testify to sexual violence, as "[ w ]omen fleeing gender-related harms 
have often not been successful in communicating their subjective fear of 
persecution even in the face of strong objective indicators because they 
have difficulty relating their claims ... to asylum decisionmakers who 
are predominantly men."46 
More generally, "[u]nderstandable anxiety affects most claimants 
compelled to recount painful facts in a formal and foreign environ-
ment."47 Thus, irrespective of culture or gender, a genuinely fearful 
applicant might be disinclined openly to display his or her most intimate 
emotions in the presence of total strangers and in the sterile atmosphere 
of a refugee status hearing. Further complicating the inquiry into an ap-
plicant's emotional state are problems related to communication. 
Uneducated or inarticulate applicants may be fearful, yet unable to put 
their feelings into words.48 Similarly, fearful applicants forced to com-
municate through an interpreter may be seen to lack fear where their 
43. Kasolo v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1996] U.K.l.A.T. 13190 (lmmigr. 
App. Trib. 1996) (U.K.) cited in MARK SYMES, CASELAW ON THE REFUGEE CONVENTION: 
THE UNITED KINGDOM'S INTERPRETATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORI-
TIES 31 (2000); see also R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Patel, [1986] Imm. 
A.R. 208 (Q.B. 1986) (Eng.) (noting the difficulties common with translations and interpret-
ers). 
44. Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Reconsidering the Criteria for Assessing Well-Founded Fear 
in Refugee Law, 25 MAN. L. J. 127, 131 (1997). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 132. 
47. Kopalapillai v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [1997] F.C.A. 1510 
(Fed. Ct. 1997) (Merkel, J.) (Aust!.). 
48. Adjin-Tettey, supra note 44, at 133 ("Only eloquent and articulate women, who are 
likely to be part of the elite, may be able to secure refugee protection while the majority may 
be denied ... because of their inability to express their subjective fear." ). 
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words and expressions are translated in ways that fail fully to convey the 
extent of their trepidation.49 
In three common factual scenarios, the subjective fear inquiry has 
proved either so difficult to conduct in practice, or simply so fraught 
with normative risks, that decisionmakers routinely dispense with the 
subjective fear requirement altogether. One such scenario is where the 
applicant for refugee status is believed to be suffering from a mental dis-
ability or trauma, in particular where the applicant is experiencing Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).50 Persons suffering from PTSD often 
do not exhibit outward signs of trepidation, but rather "dissociate" them-
selves from their reality. It is widely recognized that dissociation is a 
central characteristic of PTSD,51 and that persons who dissociate are ex-
tremely fearful, despite their outward demeanor. A person suffering the 
effects of PTSD 
may feel as though the event is not happening to her, as though 
she is observing from outside her body, or as though the whole 
experience is a bad dream from which she will shortly awaken. 
These perceptual changes combine with a feeling of indiffer-
ence, emotional detachment, and profound passivity in which 
the person relinquishes all initiative and struggle.52 
As Bossin and Demirdache conclude, this state of dissociation "is not 
one that leads to the type of actions [refugee decisionmakers] typically 
associate with a genuine subjective fear. Yet these are the actions-or in-
actions-of people who are afraid."53 
In addition to affecting demeanor, PTSD may also adversely impact 
a traumatized person's ability orally to express information related to his 
or her emotional state. Specifically, "trauma may lead to a 'speechless 
49. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Patel, [1986] Imm. A.R. 208 
(Q.B. 1986) (Webster, J.) (Eng.) ("Although the [doubts cast on demeanor evidence by 
MacKenna J.] ... overstate the difficulty of assessing the demeanour of a witness in an ordi-
nary case, when the witness is English speaking, they do not, I feel, overstate the difficulty 
and may even understate it ... when most, if not all, of the witnesses would have to give evi-
dence through an interpreter."). 
50. PTSD is common among persons who have experienced the types of trauma fre-
quently found in refugee claims, for instance: assault, detention, kidnapping, torture (mental 
and physical), and sexual assault (including rape). Michael Bossin & Laila Demirdache, A 
Canadian Perspective on the Subjective Component of the Bipartite test for "Persecution": 
Time for Re-evaluation, 22 REFUGE 111 (Mar. 2004 ). 
51. Id. at 112 (citing Bessel A. van der Kolk, The Complexity of Adaptation to Trauma: 
Self-Regulation Stimulus Discrimination, and Characterological Development, in TRAUMATIC 
STRESS: THE EFFECTS OF OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCE ON MIND, BODY, AND SOCIETY 182, 
192 (Bessel A. van der Kolk et al. eds., 1996)). 
52. Bossin & Demirdache, supra note 50, at 112 (quoting JUDITH HERMAN, M.D., 
TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 42 (2d ed. 1997)). 
53. Bossin & Demirdache, supra note 50, at 112. 
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terror,' which in some individuals interferes with the ability to put feel-
ings into words, leaving emotions to be mutely expressed by dysfunction 
of the body."s4 All told, individuals suffering from PTSD may be among 
the most fearful asylum applicants, yet they are acutely disadvantaged in 
their ability to communicate that trepidation to decisionmakers. To the 
extent that such persons are unable to communicate their trepidation, 
faithful application of the subjective fear requirement would, of course, 
result in denial of refugee status. 
Recognizing the potential for exclusion, there is widespread agree-
ment that persons suffering from PTSD and other forms of mental 
disability should be deemed eligible for refugee status notwithstanding 
their inability to satisfy the subjective fear requirement.ss The UNHCR 
Handbook, for instance, instructs that in such cases "it may not be possi-
ble to attach the same importance as is normally attached to the 
subjective element of 'fear,' which may be less reliable, and it may be 
necessary to place greater emphasis on the objective situation."s6 In as-
sessing claims of mentally disabled persons, courts have generally 
attempted to adhere to this guidance. The Federal Court of Canada, for 
instance, has held that "a person's mental condition at the time of a hear-
ing should not normally be used against him to argue that he cannot 
establish a subjective fear of persecution. . . . [I]t is the factual evidence 
that must be relied upon to prove the qualifications for Convention refu-
gee status."s7 Similarly, the English Court of Appeal endorsed a first 
instance adjudicator's decision to attach "less weight to the subjective 
element of fear of persecution ... but ... greater weight to the objective 
element" in considering the claim of a mentally ill applicant.ss 
54. Id. at 112 (citing van der Kolk, supra note 51, at 193). 
55. See Raza v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [2002] F.C.A. 350 (Full 
Fed. Ct. 2002) (Austl.) ("[T]he Tribunal must first determine whether the applicant ... has the 
requisite "well-founded fear" of persecution. This requires the Tribunal to be satisfied that 
there is a subjective fear and an objective basis for it. Absent any subjective fear then (infants 
and incapable persons apart) there can be no question whether there is a well-founded fear.") 
(emphasis added); Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff. v. Mohammed, [2000] F.C.A. 
576 (Full Fed. Ct. 2000) (Austl.) (ruling that an applicant must hold the relevant fear except in 
the case of an infant or mentally incapable person); See also UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 
4, 'II 207 (addressing analysis of the subjective element in cases where the applicant for refu-
gee status is mentally disabled) and 'II 213 (discussing the challenges associated with 
unaccompanied minors as relates to analysis of the subjective element). 
56. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, 'II 211. 
57. Rosales v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), [1993] 72 F.T.R. 1, 'II 14 
(Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1993) (Rothstein, n (Can.); see Canadian Immigration and Refugee 
Board, Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues (Sept. 30, 
1996), available at http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/about/guidelines/child_e.htm. 
58. R. v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, Ex parte Ghaly, [1998] E.W.H.C. 621 
(Adrnin.) (C.A. 1998) (Eng.). 
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Yet it must be recognized that efforts of this kind do not completely 
obviate concerns that a mentally disabled applicant facing a real risk of 
being persecuted will be denied refugee status for failing to demonstrate 
trepidation, despite his or her inability to communicate that trepidation. 
In reality, it may well be next to impossible for decisionmakers consis-
tently to distinguish mentally ill applicants (particularly those suffering 
from PTSD) from applicants who are simply not fearful. 59 And to the 
extent that PTSD goes unrecognized, a traumatized applicant is likely to 
be found not fearful, and hence, ineligible for refugee status.60 
A second type of case that has caused problems for decisionmakers 
attempting to undertake an inquiry into subjective fear is where the claim 
to refugee status is made by younger children. To the extent that a child 
is unable effectively to communicate his or her trepidation (or to connect 
it to the relevant risk), a strict application of the bipartite test would, of 
course, result in the denial of refugee status. As with mentally ill appli-
cants, however, it is generally agreed that a child who lacks capacity to 
satisfy the subjective prong of the two-part test should not be denied 
refugee status for failing to demonstrate trepidation. 
One strategy that allows decisionmakers to sidestep a child's 
inability to communicate subjective fear is to impute parental fear to the 
child. According to the UNHCR, "[i]f there is reason to believe that the 
59. While the diversity among asylum applicants makes it difficult for decisionmakers 
to detect the presence of trepidation in healthy individuals, the same diversity poses even 
greater challenges when the task is to determine whether or not a given applicant suffers from 
PTSD. According to Carlson: 
Although all of the core, secondary, and associated trauma symptoms can occur as 
part of a post-traumatic disorder, all of these will not necessarily occur. Different 
symptoms may predominate in a client's symptom picture as a result of the influ-
ence of various individual and situational factors and the length of time that has 
passed since the trauma. 
Bossin & Demirdache, supra note 50, at 111 (quoting EVE B. CARLSON, TRAUMA ASSESS-
MENTS: A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE 39 (1997)). 
Id. 
Not surprisingly, culture is a key factor complicating diagnosis of PTSD. Carlson notes: 
As with all psychological disorders, we should expect culture to greatly influence 
how symptoms are expressed. Although the bulk of research and clinical reports re-
lating to trauma responses has focused on white, middle and upper-middle class 
Americans, the research on trauma responses of persons from other cultures (and 
U.S. subcultures) that is available indicates that there may be considerable variation 
in the symptoms observed following trauma in different cultures. 
60. To some extent, decisionmakers can rely on psychological or psychiatric reports to 
help inform their determination as to the existence of PTSD in a given applicant. But such 
reports are expensive and not always available. Even where a psychological report is available, 
an expert diagnosis of PTSD does not necessarily foreclose the possibility that a traumatized 
applicant could be denied refugee status for lack of subjective fear. 
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parents wish their child to be outside the country of origin on grounds of 
well-founded fear of persecution, the child himself may be presumed to 
have that fear."61 Where this is not an option, the UNHCR Handbook 
recommends that "[w]here the minor has not reached a sufficient degree 
of maturity to make it possible to establish well-founded fear in the same 
way as for an adult, it may be necessary to have greater regard to certain 
objective factors."62 
But who qualifies for this special treatment? By what method are 
decisionmakers to determine which children have reached a sufficient 
age of maturity that they should be required to establish a subjective fear 
of being persecuted? UNHCR suggests that, in making this determina-
tion, courts should consider a child's age, level of education, and 
understanding of need to tell the truth.63 But age and level of education 
may not be accurate indicators of a child's capacity to express his or her 
trepidation, especially in an alien environment and to a complete 
stranger. Similarly, a child's willingness to tell the truth-while relevant 
in other areas of law to the issue of whether a child has capacity to tes-
tify in court-seems to have very little to do with his or her capacity to 
express trepidation. The absence of any principled method of determin-
ing which minors should be exempted from the subjective fear 
requirement injects a degree of arbitrariness into the refugee status de-
termination that is unacceptable given the extraordinary cost of error. 
A third scenario in which decisionmakers have found the subjective 
fear requirement too difficult to implement in practice occurs when sys-
tematic persecution of a specific group has resulted in a mass influx of 
similarly situated persons. In such situations, authorities often cope with 
the surge in asylum applications by prima facie group status determina-
tion. Under this approach, once the at-risk group is identified, the only 
real requirements faced by individuals seeking recognition of refugee 
status are to prove membership in the at-risk group, and that none of the 
cessation or exclusion clauses is applicable. Assuming these require-
ments are met, refugee status is routinely recognized without any inquiry 
whatsoever into whether or not the applicant is experiencing subjective 
trepidation. 
The magnitude of this exception calls into question whether there 
can be said, in practice, to be any general requirement to show subjective 
fear. In the developing world, where the majority of the world's refugees 
are located, group status determinations are the norm rather than the ex-
61. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, 'II 218. 
62. /d.'1!217. 
63. BRIAN GORLICK, COMMON BURDENS AND STANDARDS: LEGAL ELEMENTS IN AS-
SESSING CLAIMS TO REFUGEE STATUS (UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working 
Paper No. 68, Oct. 2002). 
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ception. The UNHCR's Statistical Yearbook 2002 reveals that, between 
1993 and 2002, 85% of Asia's total refugee population (3,553,305) was 
granted refugee status on the basis of group status assessment.64 In East-
ern Europe, the figure was 93%.65 Indeed, the practice is so common in 
Africa66 that Article 1(2) of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
Convention specifically identifies affirmative group status recognition as 
an alternative means of attaining Convention refugee status.67 Thus, in 
what amounts to a majority of refugee status determinations worldwide,68 
subjective fear is simply not required.69 
64. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2002: 
Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Bely Hovy ed. 2004), Statistical Annex II, 
at 147, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics. 
65. Id. Statistical Annex II, at 167. 
66. Between 1993 and 2002, for instance, 91 % of refugees were recognized on the 
basis of prima facie group status determinations (3,027,639). See id. Statistical Annex II, at 
166. 
67. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, done 
Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force June 20, 1974). 
68. Between 1993 and 2002, 68% of the world's refugees were recognized on the basis 
of prima facie group status determinations (over seven million people all told). See UNHCR 
Statistical Yearbook 2002, supra note 64, Statistical Annex II, at 145. 
69. The practice of group status recognition is widely perceived as a legitimate and 
effective way to deal with major humanitarian crises, even in the minority of states which 
operate formal status determination systems. The European Union Joint Position of 1996, for 
instance, states that: 
[e]ach application for asylum is examined on the basis of the facts and circum-
stances put forward in each individual case and taking account of the objective 
situation prevailing in the country of origin. In practice it may be that a whole 
group of people are exposed to persecution. In such cases, too, applications will be 
examined individually, although in specific cases this examination 1nay be limited to 
determining whether the individual belongs to the group in question. 
Council of the European Union, Joint Position Defined by the Council on the Basis of Article 
K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the Harmonized Application of the Definition of the 
Term "Refugee" in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, 'II 2, 1996 O.J. (L 63) 2, (emphasis added). 
Thus, in the case of no.97-1627/F797, the Belgian Commission held that the applicant's 
status as an ethnic Albanian was sufficient to establish a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted. Case no. 97-1627/F797(Commission Permanente de Recours des Refugies, Apr. 
14, 1999)(Belg.)("[D]ans le contexte qui prevaut actuellement au Kosovo, le seul fait 
d'appartenir au groupe national albanais peut justifier une crainte raisonnable d'etre persecute 
du fait de sa nationalite au sens de la Convention de Geneve."). In Switzerland, Hullmann 
notes a comparable approach: 
The measures taken against the Yizides in Turkey, as well as their intensity, in-
volved persecution of the group that made it possible to say that 'every member of 
this minority could expect to be persecuted at any time.' ... [S]imply belonging to 
this group was evidence of having a well-founded fear of persecution .... 
Klaus Hullmann, Switzerland, in WHO IS A REFUGEE? COMPARATIVE CASE LAW STUDY 128 
(Jean-Yves Carlier et al. eds., 1997) (emphasis added). 
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In sum, despite the widely held belief that trepidation is an essential 
qualification for refugee status, decisionmakers are hard pressed 
accurately and reliably to ascertain which applicants are, in fact, 
subjectively fearful. In a variety of common situations, the practical 
impediments involved in making a subjective fear determination are so 
great that decisionmakers routinely dispense with the requirement and 
grant refugee status solely on the basis of an applicant's actual risk of 
being persecuted. All this begs the question: What does subjective fear 
actually have to do with being a refugee? And if decisionmakers are 
compelled by practical considerations to deviate from the standard with 
such frequency that a majority of refugees worldwide are recognized 
without insistence upon proof of subjective fear,70 can it really be said 
that trepidation is an essential element of "well-founded fear"? 
Decisionmakers attempting to assess subjective fear, despite the in-
herent difficulties described above, have devised a host of artificial 
mechanisms to aid in the determination. These coping strategies are born 
of necessity. If subjective fear is truly an essential element of well-
founded fear, but is in reality next to impossible to detect on a reliable 
basis simply by the assessment of oral evidence and demeanor, deci-
sionmakers have little choice but to resort to more "objective" indicators 
of subjective fearfulness. 
a. Would a Reasonable Person be Fearful? 
One way courts objectify the inquiry into subjective fear is by asking 
whether a "reasonable person" would experience fear in the face of the 
risk identified. According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, "[a]n alien possesses a well-founded fear of persecution if a 
reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution if she 
were to be returned to her native country."11 This formulation has been 
adopted by the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals72 and, at least tacitly, 
70. It could be argued that the prevalence of group status determination is dictated 
simply by the practical imperatives associated with humanitarian crises and mass migration 
flows that cannot be managed any other way. It might therefore be said that determinations 
relying exclusively on group affiliation to establish a well-founded fear either represent mere 
exceptions to the general norm (requiring trepidation) or that, in such determinations, trepida-
tion is simply assumed from the fact of the applicant's membership in an at-risk group. In 
response to these hypotheses, however, it is worth noting that judgments based on group status 
determinations seldom make note of the fact that they are effectively bypassing an "essential" 
element for recognition of refugee status. If subjective fear were truly thought to be an essen-
tial qualification for recognition of refugee status, it is surprising that there would not be at 
least some acknowledgment that an exception is being made, or at least that the existence of 
trepidation is assumed. The absence of such references is more consistent with an approach 
that does not regard trepidation as an essential element. 
71. Guevara v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986) (Brown, J.). 
72. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BJ.A. 1987). 
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approved by the U.S. Supreme Court.73 As Anker observes, this approach 
to some extent obviates the worst risks associated with the duty to show 
subjective fear: 
If properly understood and applied, the Board's formulation "a 
reasonable person in the circumstances of the [applicant]" can 
reconcile the concerns [that it raises]. The subjective and objec-
tive elements should not be sharply dichotomized; rather, the 
subjectivity of the standard means that the applicant's perspec-
tive, or that of a reasonable person in her circumstances is the 
lens through which the adjudicator must evaluate the reason-
ableness of her flight. 74 
But in truth, the reasonable person inquiry dispenses with a require-
ment of subjective fear altogether. To satisfy the subjective element 
under this approach, the applicant need only establish an objective risk 
of being persecuted of a kind that would engender fear in a "reasonable 
person"-his or her own fear, or lack thereof, is completely irrelevant. 
b. Inferences from Pre-Application Conduct 
Other decisionmakers have objectified the inquiry in ways that seem 
more genuinely calculated to ascertain whether the applicant is actually 
fearful. A common strategy involves examining a person's pre-
application conduct for indications of fear. Where the applicant has be-
haved in a way that seems inconsistent with the presence of fear, at least 
in the opinion of the decisionmaker, the subjective element is deemed 
not satisfied, and refugee status is denied. Regrettably, however, the 
mechanisms employed in practice often have no logical correlation to 
the existence of fear. 
For example, some courts have inferred a lack of fear from an appli-
cant's delay in claiming refugee status.75 The Federal Court of Canada 
explained that "delay points to a lack of subjective fear of persecution, 
the reasoning being that someone who was truly fearful would claim 
73. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 n.9 (1988) (Stevens, J.) (citing the reasonable per-
son formulation from both the Mogharrabi and the Guevara Flores opinions, but stating, "We 
express no opinion on ... [that] formulation."). 
74. DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (1999). 
75. Re Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., Ex parte PT, 178 A.L.R. 497 (Aust!. 
2001); Cruz v. Can. (Minister of Employment and lmmigr.) IMM 3848-93 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 
1994) (Simpson, J.) (Can.) cited in Dcruze v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.) 
[1999] 171 F.T.R. 76 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1999) (Can.); Castillejos v. Can. (Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigr.), IMM 1950--94 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1994) (Cullent, J.) (Can.); Kamana v. 
Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 5998-98 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1999) 
(Tremblay-Lamar, J.) (Can.). 
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refugee status at the first opportunity."76 Similarly, the High Court of 
Australia has held that significant delays can negate a finding of subjec-
tive fearfulness. 77 Yet, it is difficult to discern how evidence of delay 
logically relates to the presence or absence of subjective fear. In fact, 
applicants who delay claiming refugee status may actually be more fear-
ful than those who make their claim immediately. Aware of the severe 
consequences if status is not recognized, it seems completely plausible 
that genuinely fearful persons might postpone making a claim until they 
have learned something about the country's status determination system, 
retained counsel, or otherwise sought to minimize their risk of rejection. 
Indeed, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board held.in one case 
that the applicant's "delay in claiming refugee status added to the alleged 
subjective fear, since the claimant feared being returned to France with 
the children."78 
A second means by which courts sometimes rely on pre-application 
conduct to objectify the inquiry into subjective fear is to equate the ap-
plicant's failure to claim asylum in an intermediate country with a lack 
of fearfulness. 79 In the English case of JS, an Indian applicant's route to 
England included a four month stay in Moscow, fifteen to twenty days in 
an unknown country, and travel through other countries by train.80 The 
English Court of Appeal upheld the denial of refugee status on grounds 
that the applicant's failure to claim asylum in any of the intermediate 
countries "ill accord[ed] with his claim to have fled India for fear of his 
life."81 Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently 
ruled that a Colombian applicant's failure to claim asylum in any of the 
three countries he visitecJ on a business trip before coming to America 
"undermined his claim that he genuinely feared persecution at home,"82 
leading to the denial of refugee status. In a slightly more nuanced ex-
amination, some courts afford the applicant an opportunity to explain 
why he or she did not claim asylum in intermediate countries. The un-
derlying presumption, however, is that only a particularly persuasive 
76. Castillejos v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 1950-94 (Fed. Ct. 
Trial Div. 1994) (Cullen, J.) (Can.). 
77. Re Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., Ex parte Pf, 178 A.L.R. 497 (Aust!. 
2001). 
78. CRDD No. M99-07094 (Immigr. and Refugee Bd., May 31, 2001) (Can.). 
79. See, e.g., Case Abstract /JRU0032, 2 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 138 (1990); JS v. Sec'y 
of State for the Home Dep't, [1996) E.W.C.A. Civ. 832 (C.A. 1996) (Eng.); Pelaez v. INS, 
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10305 (!st Cir. May 22, 2003). 




Id. (Pill, L.J.). 
Pelaez, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10305, at *8 (Lipez, J.). 
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explanation83 can rebut the usual inference that delay is indicative of a 
lack of subjective fear. 84 
Yet it is not immediately evident why an applicant's decision not to 
claim asylum in an intermediate country necessarily correlates to the 
absence of subjective fear. Presence of family members, employment 
possibilities, religious toleration, and ethnic affiliations are just a few 
reasons why an asylum seeker might choose to stay in one country for a 
time before moving on to another.85 Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recently acknowledged that it would be quite le-
gitimate for an individual from the Abkhaz region of Georgia to pass 
through Russia without claiming refugee status in view of his inability 
legally to secure work there. More generally, the court rejected the logic 
of any presumption that genuine refugees should seek protection in the 
first country in which they arrive: 
[A] refugee need not seek asylum in the first place where hear-
rives. . . . Rather, it is "quite reasonable" for an individual 
fleeing persecution "to seek a new homeland that is insulated 
from the instability [of his home country] and that offers more 
promising economic opportunity" ... [We have previously held 
that] "[w]e do not find it inconsistent with a claimed fear of per-
secution that a refugee after he flees his homeland, goes to the 
country where he believes his opportunities will be best."86 
In any event, the bipartite approach is purportedly concerned with 
the applicant's fear of being persecuted in her country of origin. An ap-
plicant's prolonged stay in an intermediate country might (at most) 
indicate a lack of fear with respect to conditions in that country. A less 
83. Among the factors recognized by most courts as adequate explanations for a failure 
to claim protection in an intermediate country are the lack of impending harm at the time of 
the stay there; a desire to distance oneself from the risk of incursion by the agent of persecu-
tion; and concerns regarding the commitment and ability of the intermediate country to 
provide truly adequate and durable protection. Some courts are more generous in their ap-
proach, recognizing also such concerns as the desire to make a claim in a country where one 
speaks the language, or where friends or family are present. See generally HATHAWAY, supra 
note 7, at 46-50. 
84. See, e.g., R. v. Immigr. App. Trib., Ex parte Parra, [2000] E.W.H.C. 377 (Admin.) 
(Q.B. 2000) (Eng.); Owusu-Ansah v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), 8 Imm. 
L.R. (2d) I06 (Fed. Ct. App. 1989) (Can.); Z. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Re-
form [2002] 1.E.S.C. 12, 'lI 60 (Ir. S.C. 2002). 
85. See, e.g., Owusu-Ansah v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), [1989] 8 
Imm. L.R. (2d) 106 (Fed. Ct. App. 1989) (Can.) (finding that the Ghanaian claimant's failure 
to claim refugee status in intermediate states was reasonable in view of his desire to put a 
substantial distance between himself and his persecutors, to make his claim in a country with a 
sound human rights record, and to live in an English-speaking country); See also HATHAWAY, 
supra note 7, at 46-50. 
86. Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
528 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 26:505 
lengthy stay would not signify even that much. In neither instance would 
the applicant's failure to claim refugee status in the intermediate state be 
necessarily indicative of his or her level of fear with respect to persecu-
tion in the country of origin. 
A third way that courts sometimes use evidence of pre-application 
conduct to negate a finding of subjective fear is by inferring a lack of 
fear from the applicant's delay in fleeing the country of origin.87 In the 
Australian case of Gomez,88 for example, the first instance decisionmaker 
denied asylum to a Sri Lankan family based on evidence that they de-
layed departure for twelve days after receiving visas to enter Australia, 
noting that "[h]ad [the family] indeed been in fear for their lives, I con-
sider that they would have left Sri Lanka as soon as they could, by any 
means they could." The Australian Federal Court endorsed this method 
of analysis, finding twelve days "an unusually long delay" after receiv-
ing travel visas.89 
In truth, however, while evidence of delayed flight may be probative 
of an applicant's lack of fear, even truly fearful applicants are not always 
able to depart their country of origin at the earliest possible moment. The 
applicant may have been in hiding or under the surveillance of his or her 
persecutors.90 She may have been sick or injured.91 She may have had 
family to tend to, or otherwise been trapped by circumstances that ren-
dered departure physically or psychologically difficult.92 Each of these 
circumstances could naturally delay the applicant's flight without signal-
ing an absence of fear. 
A fourth strategy is to infer a lack of fearfulness from evidence that 
the applicant engaged in preflight conduct which increased his of her 
87. See Gomez v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [2002] F.C.A. 480 (Fed. 
Ct. 2002) (Aust!.); Mejia v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 104{}-95 (Fed. 
Ct. Trial Div. 1996) (Can.); Singh v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Imrnigr.), 160 F.T.R. 
288 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1998) (Can.); Farahmandpour v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigr.), IMM 92-97 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1997) (Can.). 
88. Gomez v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [2002] F.C.A. 480 (Fed. Ct. 
2002) (Aust!.). 
89. Id. 
90. See Mejia v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 104{}-95 (Fed. Ct. 
Trial Div. 1996) (Can.) (excusing the applicant's delay on grounds that she was in hiding prior 
to her departure). 
91. See Farahmandpour v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 92-97 
(Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1997) (Can.) (finding that applicant's delay was caused by her poor 
health). 
92. See Cazak v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 1110-01 (Fed. Ct. 
Trial Div. 2002) (Can.) (where the tribunal denied refugee status because applicant did not 
leave the country immediately after being beaten by husband and receiving threats against her 
family but, on appeal, the Federal Court found delay was justified based on the psychology 
and dependence of those subject to domestic violence). 
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risk of being persecuted. In the American case of Singh v. Moschorak,93 
for instance, the applicant was an Indian national of the Sikh faith who, 
prior to claiming asylum, had worked for the All India Sikh Student 
Federation. The applicant claimed to have been detained and beaten by 
the Indian police on multiple occasions as a result of his affiliation with 
the group. The first instance decisionmaker rejected Singh's application 
on the assumption that a truly fearful person would have discontinued 
his involvement with the Student Federation after the first incidents of 
persecution. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, noting that the 
immigration judge had failed "to distinguish fortitude in the face of dan-
ger from absence of fear."94 
Indeed, one might well ask whether it is even possible to distinguish 
"fortitude" from "absence of fear." In any case, it is clear that an appli-
cant does not lack subjective fear merely because he or she has risked 
hardship in furtherance of a social or political cause. More fundamen-
tally, the denial of refugee status based on this misconception seems 
difficult to reconcile with the basic goals of refugee law. As Grahl-
Madsen observed, "The Convention seeks to protect persons who would 
be subject to political persecution through no fault of their own. In this 
connection the struggle for certain political conviction is not to be re-
garded as a fault but as a right founded in the Law of Nature."95 
A fifth way that courts sometimes use inferences from pre-
application conduct to negate a finding of subjective fear is by treating 
any return travel by an applicant to the country of origin as evidence that 
he or she does not fear being persecuted there. 96 In Maqdassy, 91 for ex-
ample, the Canadian Federal Court Trial Division considered the case of 
an Iraqi applicant who had once returned home in order to sell her house. 
Finding that the applicant's reasons for returning to Iraq were insuffi-
ciently "pressing," the court found her to lack subjective fear, and 
therefore denied refugee status. 
Yet while evidence of return may have some logical correlation to 
the presence of fear, it cannot be said that fearful applicants never travel 
to their country of origin. The decision to return to a situation of great 
peril may be dictated by the necessity of tending to sick or dying 
93. Singh v. Moschorak, 53 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 1995). 
94. Id. at 1034. 
95. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra 8, at 223. 
96. See, e.g., Thuraisamy v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [1999) F.C.A. 
1632 (Full Fed. Ct. 1999) (Austl.); Maqdassy v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), 
[2002] F.C.T. 182 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 2002) (Can.); Caballero v. Can. (Minister of Employ-
ment and Immigr.), No. A-266-91 (Fed. Ct. App. 1993) (Can.). 
97. Maqdassy v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), [2002] F.C.T. 182 (Fed. 
Ct. Trial Div. 2002) (Can.). 
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relatives.98 Indeed, as in Maqdassy, even a truly fearful applicant may be 
compelled by financial necessity to travel to her country of origin. There 
is a wide variety of personal emergencies that could lead even acutely 
fearful applicants to risk persecution by traveling to their homeland. As 
such, it would be unwise to hold that evidence of return may routinely be 
assumed to indicate whether a given applicant fears the possibility of 
being persecuted. 
The practice of denying refugee status based on evidence of return 
also raises legal concerns. The legal significance of return is expressly 
addressed by Article l(C)(4) of the Convention, which contemplates ces-
sation of refugee status not as the result of return but only upon the 
applicant's re-establishment in his or her country of origin.99 Under gen-
erally accepted understandings of the re-establishment criteria, an 
individual does not forfeit refugee status unless he or she returns to the 
country of origin "with a view to permanently resid[e] there," and not 
simply for a "temporary visit."100 While, strictly speaking, Article l(C) of 
the Convention applies to a person who has already been recognized as a 
refugee, it would be extraordinary for an act insufficient to justify cessa-
tion of refugee status nonetheless to be deemed a proper basis to deny 
refugee status in the first place. 101 
Despite all of the concerns raised in this article regarding the risks of 
surrogate indicators of subjective fear, proponents of the subjective ele-
ment might nonetheless reply that even if the subjective fear requirement 
were to be eliminated, decisionmakers would continue to rely upon the 
sorts of mechanisms described above to deny refugee status. Rather than 
treating such evidence as probative of a lack of fearfulness, they would 
simply rely upon it to determine that an applicant is not actually at risk 
98. Indeed, in another Canadian case the Federal Court of Appeal overturned a first 
instance decision to deny refugee status because the applicant's return to Sri Lanka to care for 
her sick mother showed that she was not fearful. Shanmugarajah v. Can. (Minister of Em-
ployment and Immigr.), No. A-609-91 (Fed. Ct. App. 1992) (Can.). 
99. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. l(C)(4) ("This Convention shall cease to 
apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if . . . [h]e has voluntarily re-
established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of 
persecution."). The original draft of this clause, which would have revoked the refugee status 
of any person who "returns to his country of former nationality," was rejected by the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the ground that it might bar persons who had been forcibly repatriated to their 
state of origin, as well as those who had chosen to return to their country of origin only tem-
porarily. See, e.g., U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 
Statement of the Director of the International Refugee Organization, at 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/AC.32/L.4 (1950). 
100. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, CJ[ 134. 
101. This is doubly true in light of the long delays involved in processing asylum claims. 
Particularly where an applicant has long awaited a determination of refugee status, decision-
makers undermine the strictures of the cessation clause by using evidence of return as part of a 
less constrained subjective fear analysis. 
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of being persecuted. In other words, an adverse finding as to subjective 
fear under the current bipartite approach would simply be replaced by an 
identically grounded finding that there is not a real chance of being per-
secuted in the country of origin. As such, elimination of a subjective fear 
requirement would make little practical difference to the outcome of a 
case. 
The flaw in this reasoning is not that the various concerns presently 
relied upon as objective indicators of subjective fear-evidence of delay 
in flight, of failure to claim protection in an intermediate country or at 
least immediately upon arrival in the asylum state, of voluntary assump-
tion of risk in the home state, or of return to the country of origin-are 
never relevant to the assessment of actual risk. To the contrary, when 
considered only as part of the assessment of actual risk, these factors are 
weighed together with all other evidence of risk. But when these factors 
are considered in order to determine whether the applicant meets a sepa-
rate and distinct subjective fear requirement, they may lead in and of 
themselves to a rejection of the claim without any examination of risk. 
This is because under the bipartite approach, the absence of subjective 
fear as borne out by one of these surrogate indicators leads automatically 
to denial of the claim. 
c. Treating Credibility as Fearfulness 
The most complete capitulation to the difficulties of assessing fear is 
the growing practice of equating any lack of credibility with absence of 
subjective fear, and hence, with disqualification from refugee status. Un-
der this approach, an applicant deemed credible is assumed to be 
fearful. 102 But an applicant found not to be credible in relation to any 
matter is deemed to lack subjective fear, and hence, not entitled to rec-
ognition of refugee status. 103 
102. See Ward v. Attorney General, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 'l! 54 (Can. 1993) (La Forest, J.) 
("The Board here found Ward to be credible in his testimony, thus establishing the subjective 
branch."); Maximilok v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), [1998] F.T.R. 461, 'l! 17 
(Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1998) (Joyal, J.) (Can.) ("The subjective basis for the fear of persecution 
rests solely on the credibility of the applicants."); Mario v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 
(Immigr. App. Trib. 1998) (U.K.) (UNHCR Retworld 2004 CD-ROM, issue 13) ("We find as 
a fact (a) that it is reasonably likely that the core of what [the applicant] described in his evi-
dence happened; and (b) that in consequence it is reasonably likely that he has a subjective 
fear of persecution."); Mgoian v. INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 1999) ("An alien satisfies 
the subjective component by credibly testifying that she genuinely fears persecution."); 
Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 1999) (Sweet, J.) ("The subjective component may 
be satisfied by the applicant's credible testimony that she fears persecution."); Carranza-
Hemandez v. INS, 12 F.3d 4 (2nd Cir. 1993). 
103. See, e.g., Duarte v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.) 2003 F.C. 988, 'll 15 
(Fed. Ct. 2003) (Kelen, J.) (Can.) ("[T]he Refugee Division did not err in considering delay as 
a factor in assessing the applicant's credibility with respect to her claim of a subjective fear of 
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For example, it is common practice in the United States to invoke 
inconsistencies in an applicant's statements to find him or her not to be 
credible, therefore necessarily lacking subjective fear, and consequently 
di sen titled to protection. 104 In Ramsameachire, 105 a Sri Lankan applicant 
of the Tamil ethnic group based his asylum claim on evidence of wide-
spread persecution of Tamils by governmental authorities.106 The 
immigration judge held, however, that inconsistencies between the appli-
cant's testimony at the asylum hearing and his statements at the initial 
airport interview indicated a lack of credibility, and hence, a lack of 
trepidation. He was, therefore, denied refugee status without any account 
being taken of evidence of widespread persecution of Tamils. 101 On ap-
peal, the applicant argued that the first level decisionmaker was obliged 
to consider his evidence of risk, despite the adverse credibility determi-
nation. Both the BIA and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. 
Judge Sotomayor of the Second Circuit stated: 
Ramsameachire's argument overlooks the fact that, in order to 
establish his eligibility for asylum, he had to demonstrate both 
that he subjectively feared future persecution and that his fear 
was objectively reasonable. Although his pattern or practice evi-
dence was relevant to the objective reasonableness of his fear of 
persecution, the BIA's adverse credibility determination pre-
cluded him from establishing the subjective prong of the well-
founded fear standard. The BIA was therefore justified in not 
considering Ramsameachire's proffered evidence of widespread 
persecution if forced to return to Cuba."); Emiantor v. Minister for lmmigr. and Multicultural 
Aff., (1998) F.C.A. 1186 (Full Fed. Ct., 1998) (per curiam) (Aust!.) ("Because [the Tribunal] 
did not believe [the applicants'] evidence about their Convention-based claim, it must have 
concluded that they did not have a Convention-based subjective fear."); Chudinov v. Can. 
(MinisterofCitizenship and lmmigr.), IMM 2419-97, 'I! 19 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1998) (Can.). 
104. See, e.g., Valderrama v. INS, 260 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Because we 
hold that substantial evidence supports the BIA's denial of asylum on the basis of its adverse 
credibility finding [based on discrepancies between the applicant's first and second petitions], 
we do not reach the issue whether the record supports the BIA's finding that [the petitioner] 
also lacks an objective, well-founded fear of persecution."); Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 
F.2d 1251, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming lower court ruling that "because [petitioner] 
failed to present 'candid, credible and sincere testimony' demonstrating genuine fear of perse-
cution, he failed to satisfy the subjective component of the well-founded fear standard") 
(citations omitted). But see Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 476 (3d. Cir. 2003) (cautioning 
against placing too much weight on inconsistencies between an asylum affidavit and subse-
quent testimony); Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that applicant must 
be fearful in light of strong evidence of risk, despite some inconsistencies in his testimony). 
105. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169 (2nd Cir. 2004). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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persecution of Tamils before rejecting his asylum application 
(emphasis added). 108 
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Yet the premise that applicants found not to be credible necessarily 
lack subjective fear is fundamentally illogical, as it erroneously assumes 
that fearful applicants do not lie or exaggerate in the course of relating 
their story. This assumption defies common sense. As the Australian 
Federal Court correctly observed, "[G]enuine refugees are often at a dire 
disadvantage as to their capacity to bring their cases and are ... 'en-
gaged in an often desperate battle for freedom, if not life itself.' 
Exaggeration and lies are accordingly to be expected from some of 
them."109 Out of desperation to avoid being returned to a situation of risk, 
even truly fearful applicants may lie and exaggerate. 110 Thus, some appli-
cants found to lack credibility may in fact be subjectively fearful. 
Moreover, the equation of non-credibility with an absence of trepida-
tion, and hence, with disentitlement to refugee status, is fundamentally at 
odds with the generally accepted view that credibility is not a per se re-
quirement for refugee status. 111 This point was clearly made by the Full 
Federal Court of Australia in Perchine: 
[T]here will be some cases where, although an applicant is dis-
believed, or indeed the Tribunal might be positively satisfied on 
the balance of probabilities that the applicant's account of events 
did not occur, nevertheless an inquiry ought to be made as to 
whether there is a real and substantial possibility that something 
like what the applicant is saying, may have occurred in his or her 
case. A positive conclusion on that question may bear on the 
conclusion as to whether there is a real chance of persecution. 112 
l 08. Id. at 183. 
109. Kalala v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [2001] F.C.A. 1594, 'J[ 3 (Full 
Fed. Ct. 2001) (Aust!.) (applying the reasoning in Re Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural 
Aff. of the Commonwealth of Australia, Ex parte Abebe, [1999] 162 A.L.R. l (Aust!. 1999)). 
110. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff. v. Rajalingam, [1999] EC.A. 719, 'J[ 83 
(Fed. Ct. 1999) (Sackville, J.) (Aust!.). The tribunal found the applicant to be lacking in credi-
bility, and thus found no subjective fear and denied asylum. The Federal Court overruled, 
questioning whether credibility should play any role in the decision and sympathizing with the 
willingness of the applicant's grandmother to "do anything to improve her granddaughter's 
life chances, including, if necessary, exaggerating or fabricating events." Id. 
111. See, e.g., Lai v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 245, 
'Jl 3 (Fed. Ct. App. 1989) (Marceau, J.A.) (Can.) ("Having looked at the Applicant's testimony 
and found that part of it was not quite credible, [the court of first instance] concluded that the 
subjective element was lacking, thus bringing the matter to an end. This was not a proper 
approach."). 
112. Perchine v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [2001] EC.A. 1254, 'll 8 
(Full Fed. Ct. 2001) (Aust!.). 
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While the testimony of a non-credible applicant cannot be relied 
upon to establish an actual risk of being persecuted, the required evi-
dence of risk frequently exists separately, and apart from, the applicant's 
testimony. In such cases, there is a clear legal duty to recognize refugee 
status. 113 But when evidence of non-credibility is relied upon to dismiss a 
claim for absence of subjective fear, there is no opportunity even to con-
sider other evidence of actual risk. 
All told, the various mechanisms designed artificially to validate 
subjective fear are, at best, unreliable, and at worst violate established 
protection principles. 
B. Fear to Supplement an Objectively Weak Claim 
While the bipartite understanding of "well-founded fear" is pre-
dominant in contemporary practice, some present support exists as well 
for the view that evidence of intense trepidation, while not an essential 
element, may (where present) be used to supplement weak evidence of 
actual risk. This entirely different form of subjective element is, in es-
sence, a "top-up" mechanism in that it allows refugee status to be 
recognized, at least in extreme cases, despite evidence of risk that would 
otherwise be insufficient. 
The UNHCR Handbook seems to endorse this use of a subjective 
element. At paragraph 41, it instructs that "[f]ear must be reasonable. 
Exaggerated fear, however, may be well-founded if, in all the circum-
stances of the case, such a state of mind can be regarded as justified."114 
In other words, evidence of extreme trepidation ("exaggerated fear") that 
is understandable in light of an applicant's background and the surround-
ing circumstances is a factor capable of overcoming an insufficiency of 
actual risk. At paragraph 42, the UNHCR Handbook seems to use the 
notion of "intolerability" as a short-hand for extreme trepidation: "[T]he 
applicant's fear should be considered well-founded if he can establish, to 
a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin has 
become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or 
would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there."115 
Despite the obvious appeal of this understanding from the perspec-
tive of refugees and their advocates, reliance on evidence of subjective 
trepidation as a "plus factor" may be quite unfair, as it results in the dis-
parate treatment of applicants identically situated with respect to their 
113. See Attakora v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), A-1091-87, 'lI 13 (Fed. 
Ct. App. 1989) (Hugessen, J.) (Can.) ("Whether or not the applicant was a credible witness ... 
does not prevent him from being a refugee if his political opinions and activities are likely to 
lead to his arrest and punishment."). 
114. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, 'lI 41. 
115. Id. 'lI 42. 
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actual risk of being persecuted. Whenever subjective fear is thought rele-
vant to the assessment of refugee status, persons who are more timid or 
demonstrative, or who are simply more able to articulate their trepidation 
in ways recognizable as such by decisionrnakers, are advantaged relative 
to others who face the same level of actual risk, but who are more coura-
geous, more reserved, or whose expressions of trepidation are not 
identified as such. The result is that applicants viewed by decisionrnakers 
as fearful may be granted refugee status, whereas applicants facing identi-
cal risks of being persecuted, but who are deemed not to be sufficiently 
fearful, may be denied protection. Disparate treatment of identically situ-
ated claimants based solely on a decisionrnaker's impressions regarding 
the presence or absence of fear is difficult to square with refugee law's 
fundamental goal of providing surrogate protection to persons who are 
1 . k 116 tru y at ns . 
II. "FEAR" AS FORWARD-LOOKING EXPECTATION OF RISK 
We earlier observed that there are two linguistically plausible inter-
pretations of "fear."111 Although the term may signify an emotional 
reaction of trepidation on the part of the applicant for refugee status, 
"fear" can equally refer to his or her forward-looking expectation of risk. 
We argue here that in view of the duty to interpret a treaty based not 
solely on text, but also to take account of its context, object, and pur-
pose, 118 the latter understanding of "fear" as forward-looking expectation 
of risk is more legally authentic. This understanding of "fear" as mandat-
ing only an anticipatory appraisal of risk is moreover fully consistent 
with a second principle of treaty interpretation, namely that equal atten-
tion must be given to all legally authoritative versions of the treaty. 
Therefore, in the context of the Refugee Convention, equal attention 
must be given to the French language version of the treaty and to the 
general practice of courts interpreting "craignant avec raison" (the 
French language counterpart to "well-founded fear") not to make sub-
stantive use of trepidation in assessing "well-founded fear." Finally, a 
treaty should be interpreted to the extent possible in a way that avoids 
internal inconsistency. In the case of the Refugee Convention, this means 
reconciling the approach to "well-founded fear" with Articles l(C)(5-6), 
116. See infra Part II.A. 
117. See supra pp. 506-508. 
118. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 3, 1969, art. 
31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 81.L.M. 679 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accor-
dance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
light of its object and purpose.")[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
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which authorize the cessation of refugee status without regard to an ap-
plicant's mental state, and with the clear concern of Article 33's duty of 
non-refoulement to ensure that refugees are not exposed to the actual risk 
of harm. 
A. Taking Account of the Convention's Object and Purpose 
The Refugee Convention was designed to provide surrogate protec-
tion to persons at risk of being persecuted in their country of origin for 
one of the five enumerated reasons, and only to such persons. As the Su-
preme Court of Canada held in Ward: 
The international community was meant to be a forum of second 
resort for the persecuted, a "surrogate", approachable upon fail-
ure of local protection. The rationale upon which international 
refugee law rests is not simply the need to give shelter to those 
persecuted by the state, but, more widely, to provide refuge to 
those whose home state cannot or does not afford them protec-
. f . 119 t10n rom persecution. 
In Horvath, the House of Lords similarly adopted the view that 
"[t]he general purpose of the Convention is to enable the person who no 
longer has the benefit of protection against persecution for a Convention 
reason in his own country to tum for protection to the international 
community." 120 
Given the Convention's risk-oriented focus, it would be anomalous 
indeed to ascribe to "fear" a meaning that encourages states to distin-
guish between applicants identically situated with respect to risk, and 
solely on the basis of individual temperament. Yet when subjective fear 
is deemed an essential qualification for refugee status, and even when it 
is used as a "plus factor," the result is to advantage the claims of appli-
cants whose trepidation can be readily identified by decisionmakers and 
to disadvantage individuals who, for whatever reason, do not project 
fearfulness. The disparate treatment of applicants identically situated 
with respect to their actual risk of being persecuted is difficult to square 
with the human rights-based goals of refugee law. As the Australian 
Federal Court eloquently explained: 
The Convention aims at the protection of those whose human 
dignity is imperiled, the timorous as well as the bold, the inar-
ticulate as well as the outspoken, the followers as well as the 
119. Ward v. Attorney General, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 'II 40 (Can. 1993) (La Forest, J.). 
120. Horvath v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (2000] 3 All E.R. 577, 581 (H.L. 
2000) (U.K.). 
Winter 2005) Convention's ReLJuirement of "Well-Founded Fear" 
leaders in religious, political, or social causes, in a word, the or-
dinary person as well as the extraordinary one. 121 
537 
The United Kingdom Immigration Appeal Tribunal has similarly ob-
served that "[i]t may be inadvisable to place too much weight upon the 
subjective element ... in order to avoid different treatment of persons 
similarly placed, and in order to avoid penalizing the courageous."122 
Our concern is that the bipartite understanding of "well-founded 
fear" requires that an applicant who either is not fearful, or whose fear is 
not identified as such, be denied refugee status; yet an identically situ-
ated applicant who appears from a decisionmaker's standpoint to look 
fearful is to be found eligible for international protection. Even assuming 
that decisionmakers are able reliably and accurately to identify trepida-
tion (an assumption earlier refuted at length)/23 this result cannot be 
reconciled to the object of the Refugee Convention. As the Canadian 
Federal Court of Appeal has noted, "the definition of a refugee is cer-
tainly not designed to exclude brave or simply stupid persons in favor of 
those who are more timid or more intelligent."124 
Though clearly less problematic from a protection standpoint, the 
view that evidence of trepidation is appropriately used to supplement an 
otherwise weak case also runs afoul of the Convention's object and 
purpose. In Chan, the High Court of Australia observed that "the object 
of the Convention is not to relieve fears which are all in the mind, 
however understandable, but to facilitate refuge for those who are in 
need of it."125 While there may be compelling reasons for wanting to be 
generous to intensely fearful persons who do not face a genuine risk of 
being persecuted in their country of origin, the Refugee Convention was 
not intended as an all-encompassing source of humanitarian relief. 126 
121. Win v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [2001] EC.A. 132, 'Il 20 (Full 
Fed. Ct. 2001) (Madgwick, J.) (Aust!.). 
122. See Ali v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, No. 17300, HX 62265/96, (lmmigr. 
App. Trib. 1998) (U.K.). 
123. See supra Part l.A.2 for a detailed discussion of the inherent difficulties associated 
with determining whether an applicant is or is not fearful. 
124. Yusuf v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Irnmigr.), [1991] l F.C. 629, 'Il 5 (Fed. 
Ct. App. 1992) (Hugessen, J.) (Can.); see also HATHAWAY, supra note 7, at 69 ("[l]t would be 
anomalous to define international legal obligations in such a way that persons facing the same 
harm would receive differential protection."); DAVID JACKSON, IMMIGRATION: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 447 (1999) ("An applicant should not be banned from refugee status because of his 
bravery or foolhardiness, nor should he receive an advantage for timidity."). 
125. Chan v. Minister for Immigr. and Ethnic Aff., [1989] 169 C.L.R. 379, 397 (Aust!. 
1989). 
126. Butler v. Att'y Gen'!, [1999] N.Z.A.R. 205 (C.A. 1997) (N.Z.) ("The test [for rec-
ognition of refugee status] is for instance sharply different from the humanitarian tests 
provided for in the Immigration Act. ... It does not in particular range widely over the rights 
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States are, of course, free to act in ways that go beyond the requirements 
of the Refugee Convention, but only persons who truly face the risk of 
being persecuted are eligible for Convention refugee status. 
In short, the object and purpose of the Convention as adumbrated by 
senior courts strongly support an interpretation of "fear" that emphasizes 
its anticipatory rather than emotive qualities. The substantive considera-
tion of subjective fear as part of the "well-founded fear" inquiry is 
inconsistent with established protection principles, and is otherwise out of 
keeping with the goals of refugee law. In contrast, the risk-oriented under-
standing of "fear" as forward-looking expectation, and as mandating only 
a prospective appraisal of an applicant's risk, is very much in harmony 
with the Convention's central goals. 
B. "Craignant avec raison . ... " 
Dominant practice under the equally authoritative French language 
version of the Refugee Convention121 also supports the view that the 
well-founded fear requirement neither conditions access to refugee status 
on a showing of trepidation, nor allows evidence of trepidation (where 
present) to override otherwise insufficient evidence of actual risk. The 
"well-founded fear" requirement is articulated in the French language 
text as "craignant avec raison."128 Like its English language counterpart, 
the French verb "craindre" may be understood either in the sense of 
trepidation, or to signal forward-looking expectation. 129 While either is a 
linguistically plausible interpretation, practice in Francophone states 
more commonly conforms to the latter meaning. Courts applying "craig-
nant avec raison" do not require a demonstration of trepidation; indeed, 
the test for "craignant avec raison" generally does not seem to require 
any consideration at all of the applicant's subjective state of mind. 
In France, for example, the inquiry into well-founded fear seems 
singularly focused on the applicant's risk of being persecuted. In the re-
cent jurisprudence, there have been no decisions that deny status for lack 
of subjective fear. When courts find the evidence of risk compelling, 
refugee status is routinely recognized without an inquiry into the appli-
cant's emotional state, 130 even where the applicant's behavior might have 
and interests in respect of the family: the refugee inquiry is narrowly focused on the persecu-
tion and protection of the particular claimant. ... "). 
127. Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. 33(1) ("When a treaty is authenticated in 
two or more languages the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty 
provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail."). 
128. See Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. l(A)(2). 
129. See 3 LE GRAND ROBERT DE LA LANGUE FRANyAISE, supra note 12, at 11. 
130. Case no. 140222, Straravecka (Commission des Recours des Refugies, Oct. 22, 
1990) (Fr.). See also Case no. 312811, Chiporev (Commission des Recours des Refugies, June 
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aroused suspicion that he or she was not in fact fearful. 131 Likewise, 
French courts do not recognize refugee status on the basis of trepidation 
(or personal "intolerability") where the evidence of risk is otherwise 
lacking. Even faced with highly sympathetic applicants having suffered 
severe past persecution, French courts remain focused on the actual risk 
of being persecuted; in such cases, an applicant's trepidation does not, 
for example, trump evidence of changed circumstances. 132 
Swiss courts have adopted an approach that is also squarely directed 
to analysis of actual risk. 133 Although the jurisprudence acknowledges a 
subjective component in "craignant avec raison," this aspect of the test is 
confined to analysis of particularized evidence of risk and involves no 
substantive consideration of subjective fear. 134 Neither do Francophone 
courts in Belgium require subjective fear as a prerequisite to refugee 
status. In the vast majority of cases, the applicant's prospective risk of 
being persecuted is the decisive factor in the "craignant avec raison" in-
quiry.135 Only in exceedingly rare cases do Belgian courts seem inclined 
to use evidence of intense fear to supplement an otherwise weak case. 136 
17, 1997) (Fr.) (UNHCR Retworld 2004 CD-ROM, issue 13) (granting refugee protection 
after citing strong objective evidence, without any genuine inquiry into subjective fear); Case 
no. 226842, Hoyam Tawfig (Commission des Recours des Refugies, Sept. 15, 1992) (Fr.) 
(examining only objective evidence to find that well-founded fear has been established); Case 
no. 313783, Tshikuta Nyamabo (Commission des Recours des Refugies, Nov. 5, 1997) (Fr.) 
(UNHCR Retworld 2004 CD-ROM, issue 13). 
131. In Straravecka, for instance, the Commission observed that the applicant had left 
Albania with a valid passport and visa-a circumstance that other jurisdictions have seized on 
to assert that the applicant lacked the required subjective fear. Nevertheless, the Commission 
recognized refugee status, noting that the applicant "doit etre regarde eu egard a la gravite des 
persecutions subies, comme craignant avec raison .... " Case no. 140222, Straravecka (Com-
mission des Recours des Refugies, Oct. 22, 1990) (Fr.). 
132. The 2002 Miry case is illustrative of this approach. In Miry, an Afghani applicant 
had been subjected to horrible persecution, including torture, under the Taliban regime. The 
applicant was nevertheless denied protection as a refugee in France on grounds that the Tali-
ban regime had since fallen from power. ("[N]i les pieces de dossier ni Jes declarations faites 
en seances publique ... ne permettent de tenir pour fondees les craintes actuelles et person-
nelles de persecutions enoncees par le requerant en cas de retour dans son pays d'origine, 
compte tenu des changements politiques qui ont eu lieu en Afghanistan et qui se sont traduits 
par la chute des regimes auxquels ii impute Jes persecutions dont ii aurait ete victime."). Case 
no. 400706, Miry (Commission des Recours des Refugies, June 14, 2002) (Fr.). 
133. Ktilin, supra note 24, at 28. 
134. See, e.g., N.K. et famille, EMARK 1997/10 66, at 73 (Asylum App. Comm., Oct. 
21, 1996) (Switz.) (In identifying the relevance,of both subjective and objective components to 
the "craignant avec raison" standard, concerning the subjective inquiry, the court instructed 
that account should be taken of the applicant's personal history, in particular of past persecu-
tion, and of his or her membership of ethnic, religious, social or political groups that exposed 
him to such measures. The court made clear that these "subjective" factors were to be consid-
ered (alongside "objective" factors) in determining whether a reasonable person in the 
applicant's position would fear persecution.). 
135. Gaetan de Moffarts, Report from Belgium (Permanent Appeals Commission for 
Refugees, Jan. 29, 2003) ("In the great majority of cases treated by the Commission, the 
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It is of course true that the usual practice of civil law courts not to 
elaborate legal reasoning at length makes it difficult to discern with 
precision the rationale for the commitment of Francophone jurisprudence 
to a fundamentally risk-oriented interpretation of "craignant avec raison." 
Yet it is unmistakable that courts interpreting the equally authoritative 
version of the Convention have not undertaken the "trepidation journeys" 
which characterize practice in most jurisdictions where the English 
language text is relied upon. Francophone courts have clearly adopted an 
interpretation of "craindre" that emphasizes its anticipatory rather than its 
emotive qualities. 
Prevailing practice under the French language text is an important 
factor to be considered in determining the meaning to be given to the 
notion of "well-founded fear." The terms in the refugee definition "are 
presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text." 137 Thus, if 
"craindre" and "fear" have the same meaning, and if subjective trepida-
tion is not considered relevant to satisfaction of the French language test, 
it follows that the textual argument for seeing use of the term "fear" as 
necessarily predicating refugee status on the existence of trepidation is 
significantly weakened. This, in turn, should direct attention back to the 
object and purpose of the Refugee Convention which,'38 as noted above, 
are oriented to an understanding of refugee status that is focused on pro-
tection from actual risk of being persecuted. 
C. Internal Consistency 
An understanding of "fear" as forward-looking expectation of harm 
is further confirmed by the structure of the Convention, in particular Ar-
ticle 1 ( C)( 5-6), 139 which authorizes the cessation of refugee status 
notion 'well-founded fear' encompasses as well an objective as a subjective dimension. Most 
decisions will thus be based on an analysis, a balancing of both elements. It has to be said that 
the objective dimension remains a determinant factor in the decision process to grant or not to 
grant the refugee status.") (emphasis added); See also Case no. 02-1456/E458 (Vaste Beroep-
scommissie voor Vluchtelingen, Dec. 13, 2002) (Belg.) (considering both objective and 
subjective elements, but relying principally on strong objective evidence to assess well-
founded fear); Case No. 00-1530/Fl 191 (Commission Permanente de Recours des Refugies, 
Apr. 6, 2001) (Belg.) (assessing risk based on individuated, objective evidence without dis-
cussing subjective fear); Case No. 00-0749/FI093 (Commission Permanente de Recours des 
Refugies, Dec. 14, 2000) (Belg.) (stating that the strong objective evidence in this case is 
sufficient to establish well-founded fear, without a genuine discussion of subjective fear). 
136. See Case No. 00-1561/Fl091 (Commission Permanente de Recours des Refugies, 
Dec. 8, 2000) (Belg.). 
137. Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. 33(3). 
138. Id. art. 33(4). 
139. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. l(C)(5-6), which state that the Convention 
ceases to apply if: 
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without regard to an applicant's mental state. Under this cessation 
clause, states may revoke protection where the conditions that gave rise 
to the need for protection have "ceased to exist."140 
It is particularly noteworthy that Article 1 (C) does not provide for 
cessation of refugee status upon dissipation of the applicant's subjective 
fear. If the drafters had intended the test for well-founded fear to require 
a demonstration of both objective risk and subjective fear, they would 
logically have provided for cessation of status where either essential 
element of the well-founded fear test was no longer met. The fact that 
cessation is authorized only where the evidence points to the elimination 
of the objective risk of harm, and not where an applicant ceases to have a 
subjective fear of being persecuted, offers strong support for an under-
standing of "well-founded fear" fundamentally oriented to actual risk. 141 
More generally, the notion that subjective fear should play no sub-
stantive role in the assessment of well-founded fear is bolstered by the 
fact that the cessation criteria under Article l(C)(5-6) do not contem-
plate a dispensation from cessation due to change of actual 
circumstances to accommodate persons who remain subjectively fearful 
of return. 142 While UNHCR has proposed that the humanitarian proviso 
established in the case of pre-World War II refugees143 should be 
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has 
been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail him-
self of the protection of the country of his nationality; 
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because of the circumstances in 
connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, 
able to return to the country of his former habitual residence; 
140. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. l(C)(5-6); see also U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, The lntematioTWl Protection of Refugees: Interpreting Article 1 of the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 20 REFUGEE SuRv. Q. 77, 93 (Oct. 2001) 
("Cessation of refugee status may be understood as, essentially, the mirror of the reasons for 
granting such status found in the inclusion elements of Article l(A)(2). When those reasons 
disappear, in most cases so too will the need for international protection.")[hereinafter inter-
preting Article l]. 
141. See R. v. Sec'y of State for the Horne Dep't, Ex pane Yogathas, [2002] 4 All E.R. 
800, 830 (H.L. 2002) (Scott, L.J.) (U.K.) ("Refugee status is a temporary status for as long as 
the risk of persecution remains."). 
142. HATHAWAY, supra note 7, at 69 ("[The fundamentally objective focus] is buttressed 
by the fact that the Convention provides for the cessation.of refugee status upon the establish-
ment of safe conditions in the country of origin, whether or not the refugee continues to 
harbour a subjective fear of return."). 
143. Article l(C)(5-6) allows statutory refugees to retain their refugee status under cer-
tain conditions: "Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section 
A( 1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecu-
tion for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality." Refugee 
Convention, supra note 2, art. l(C)(5-6). Such a position has been incorporated in the con-
temporary approaches of Canada and the United States, where asylum law or regulations 
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extended to contemporary refugees as well, 144 there is no requirement in 
the Refugee Convention to do so. The English Court of Appeal has re-
cently considered precisely this question and concluded that although 
"[i]t would be understandable if some states had decided to apply the 
["compelling reasons"] principle to all Convention refugees for admira-
ble humanitarian reasons[,] that does not amount to a recognition of a 
legal obligation to do so ... Aspirations are to be distinguished from 
legal obligations."145 
Beyond the fact that subjective fearfulness appears irrelevant both to 
the cessation of refugee status and to exemption from cessation based 
upon the dissipation of actual risk, it is noteworthy that the most impor-
tant right that accrues to refugees-the protection from refoulement 
(return) under Article 33 of the Convention146-also has no relation to 
subjective fear. Article 33 limits its protection to persons whose "life or 
freedom would be threatened" for a Convention reason. As Weis affirms, 
the drafters intended this expression to serve as a shorthand for the full 
refugee definition set out in Article l(A)(2) of the Convention. 147 The 
decidedly objective thrust of this core duty therefore affords further sup-
port for an interpretation of the notion of well-founded fear that is 
oriented to the protection of persons actually at risk. 
provide all refugees with continued refugee protection, despite a change in their home country, 
if the refugee can show compelling reasons arising from past persecution for refusing to return 
to their home country. See U.S. Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(l)(iii)(a) 
(2005); Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, ch. 27, S.C. 2001, § 108(4) (Can.). 
144. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, 'lI 136 ("The reference to Article IA (I) indi-
cates that the exception applies to 'statutory refugees.' At the time when the 1951 Convention 
was elaborated, these formed the majority of refugees. The exception, however, reflects a 
more general humanitarian principle, which could also be applied to refugees other than statu-
tory refugees."). 
145. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Hoxha, [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 
(C.A. 2002) (Keene, L.J.) (Eng.). 
146. In relevant part, Article 33 provides: "No Contracting State shall expel or return 
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion." Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33(1). 
147. "The words 'where their life or freedom was threatened' may give the impression 
that another standard is required than for refugee status in Article 1. This is, however, not the 
case. The Secretariat draft referred to refugees 'escaping from persecution' and to the obliga-
tion not to turn back refugees 'to the frontier of their country of origin, or to territories where 
their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, or 
political opinions.' In the course of drafting the words 'country of origin', 'territories where 
their life or freedom was threatened' and 'country in which he is persecuted' were used inter-
changeably ... [T]here was no intention to introduce more restrictive criteria than that of 
'well-founded fear of persecution' used in Article l(A)(ii)." PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE CON-
VENTION, 1951 303 (1995). 
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III. ENSURING ATTENTION TO THE APPLICANT'S CASE 
Each of the understandings of a subjective element critiqued in Part I 
views an applicant's subjective fear as a factor worthy of consideration, 
either as an essential element or as a "plus factor." In contrast, some sup-
port exists for a more diffuse form of subjective element intended merely 
to particularize the inquiry into actual risk, without substantive consid-
eration of fear. Indeed, there are three distinct approaches which accept 
that the sole focus of the well-founded fear inquiry is an analysis of the 
actual risk of being persecuted, yet which posit the necessity of a subjec-
tive element to give pride of place to the unique circumstances of 
persons claiming Convention refugee status. 
One such understanding sees the subjective element as necessary to 
ensure the substantive admissibility of evidence adduced by an applicant, 
including his or her testimony (the assumption being that without a sub-
jective element, only externally generated evidence of risk would be 
taken into account). At the core of this understanding of the subjective 
element is a presumed categorical distinction between evidence adduced 
by the applicant, deemed "subjective" evidence, and evidence from 
other, "more objective" sources. The Swiss case of N.K. et famille is il-
lustrative of this approach. The court there observed that the subjective 
element allowed "account [to] be taken of the applicant's personal his-
tory, in particular of past persecution, and of his or her membership in 
ethnic, religious, social or political groups that exposed him to such 
measures."148 The court made clear that these "subjective" factors were to 
be considered (alongside "objective" factors) in determining whether a 
"reasonable person" in the applicant's position would fear being perse-
cuted.149 
A second way that a subjective element may be thought to particular-
ize the inquiry into well-founded fear is by prioritizing the applicant's 
testimony. Under this approach, the subjective element functions not just 
to ensure the admission of the applicant's testimony, but actually re-
quires that such evidence be accorded enhanced weight in the 
assessment of risk. The UNHCR Handbook offers some support for this 
understanding of the subjective element: 
148. N.K. et famille, EMARK 1997/10 66, at 73 (Asylum App. Comm., Oct. 21, 1996) 
(Switz.) (unofficial translation). Goodwin-Gill has similarly observed that "[w]hat seems to be 
intended [by the subjective element] is not so much ... subjective fear, as evidence of the 
subjective aspects of an individual's life, including beliefs and commitments." Guy Gooo-
WIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-41 (2d. ed. 1996). 
149. N.K. et famille, EMARK 1997/10 66, at 73-74 (Asylum App. Comm., Oct. 21, 
1996) (Switz.) (unofficial translation). 
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Determination of refugee status will therefore primarily require 
an evaluation of the applicant's statements rather than a judg-
ment on the situation prevailing in his country of origin. To the 
element of fear-a state of mind and a subjective condition-is 
added the qualification "well-founded." This implies that it is not 
only the frame of mind of the person concerned that determines 
his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must be supported 
by an objective situation.150 
The rationale for this understanding of the subjective element ap-
pears to be that the applicant's testimony constitutes the "best evidence" 
of risk. 151 Thus, so long as credibility is established and the applicant's 
testimony shows that he or she meets the substantive requirements of the 
refugee definition, status should ordinarily be recognized. In essence, 
this understanding of the subjective element aims to protect individuals 
who face a real but unverifiable risk of future persecution. The implicit 
assumption is that such persons would be denied refugee status but for 
the existence of a subjective element. 
A third version of the thesis that there is a subjective element-
though not one that involves consideration of subjective fear-suggests 
that a subjective element is the means by which an applicant's particular 
vulnerabilities (psychological or physical) are afforded substantive con-
sideration in determining whether the anticipated harm rises to the level 
of persecution. The subjective element is conceived as the means to per-
sonalize the inquiry into well-founded fear by allowing decisionmakers 
to distinguish between applicants facing the same treatment, but whose 
particular physical or psychological make-up render them differentially 
at-risk of being persecuted. A subjective element that allows for consid-
eration of particularized susceptibilities is said to be necessary so that 
decisionmakers can properly estimate the probability that a specific ap-
plicant will be subject to adverse treatment amounting to persecution if 
returned to his or her country of origin: 
There may be instances where ... objective circumstances in 
themselves do not appear to be compelling, but taking into ac-
count the individual's own background, belief system, and 
150. REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 'll'l! 37-38. 
151. In theory, this premise applies with equal force to every case, even those in which 
persuasive non-testimonial evidence of risk is available. As a practical matter, however, it 
would be unnecessary to give greater weight to an applicant's testimony unless evidence from 
"more objective" sources is ambiguous or incomplete. The UNHCR Handbook accordingly 
instructs that "[d]ue to the importance that the definition attaches to the subjective element, an 
assessment of credibility is indispensable where the case is not sufficiently clear from the facts 
on record." Id. 'l[ 41. 
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activities, the circumstances may well indeed be considered as 
substantiating a well-founded fear for that individual, although 
the objective circumstances might not be so considered for an-
other.152 
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The need for a subjective element to validate particularized vulner-
abilities has been posited in particular where an applicant seeks to 
establish a well-founded fear of being persecuted based on restrictions 
on his or her religious freedom. In such cases, UNHCR regards the exis-
tence of a subjective element as the means by which account can be 
taken of an applicant's background and beliefs to determine whether the 
inability to practice his or her religion amounts to persecution: 
Fear ... is the subjective element of the definition. To assess 
whether it is present or not, it is important to interview in 
depth-to obtain all possible information about the applicant's 
background. Do not forget that two persons, in the same "objec-
tive" situation, may react differently; for example, the inability 
to practice one's religion may make life intolerable for one indi-
vidual, but not for another of the same religion. (UNHCR 
Handbook paras. 40, 22). In this case, fear is clearly present. 153 
Underlying this approach is the assumption that, without a subjective 
element, refugee status would be denied to applicants who risk harm 
grave enough to qualify as persecution only because of the way in which 
a given phenomenon impacts on a person with specific vulnerabilities. 
In this section, we elaborate our view that a subjective element is not 
needed in order to particularize the well-founded fear inquiry in any of 
the ways described above. All evidence probative of an applicant's risk 
of being persecuted is admissible to establish a well-founded fear, re-
gardless of its origin. Thus, a subjective element is not needed in order to 
ensure that evidence adduced by the applicant is taken into account. As 
regards the second approach, existing doctrine already establishes an 
appropriate level of deference to the applicant's testimony and other evi-
dence. A subjective element that would go farther still, actually requiring 
substantive prioritization of the applicant's testimony, is not needed and 
may amount to over-compensation. Nor is a subjective element needed 
to enable decisionmakers to take account of the way in which an appli-
cant's particular susceptibilities affect the determination of what 
treatment rises to the level of persecution. While such factors are rarely 
relevant to the well-founded fear inquiry, the applicant's particular 
152. Interpreting Article/, supra note 140, at 80. 
153. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, DETERMINATION OF REFUGEE 
STATUS 22-23 (1989). 
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physical or psychological vulnerabilities are appropriately taken into 
account as part of the analysis of whether the harm anticipated rises to 
the level of a risk of "being persecuted." 
A. Admissibility of the Applicant's Evidence 
Implicit in the view that a subjective element is needed to allow for 
the admission of individuated evidence of risk is an assumption that 
evidence adduced by the applicant is qualitatively different than 
externalized evidence garnered from more detached sources. Likewise, it 
is assumed that without a subjective element refugee status would be 
denied to persons who, for whatever reason, face a risk greater than would 
be revealed by the so-called objective (externally generated) evidence 
alone. It is thus predicated on a categorical distinction between so-called 
"subjective evidence" and externally generated evidence from "more 
objective" sources. 
In truth, however, no such categorical distinctions among different 
forms of evidence exist. Rather, all evidence probative of an applicant's 
risk of being persecuted is to be admitted as part of the assessment of 
actual risk and accorded the weight due it on the merits. The only appro-
priate distinction is between relevant evidence, which is admissible, and 
irrelevant evidence, which is inadmissible. The source of that evidence is 
simply immaterial. This point was made by Sedley L.J. in the English 
Court of Appeal decision in Karanakaran: 
[D]ecision-makers, on classic principles of public law, are re-
quired to take everything material into account. Their sources of 
information will frequently go well beyond the testimony of the 
applicant and include in-country reports, expert testimony and-
sometimes-specialized knowledge of their own (which must of 
course be disclosed). No probabilistic cut-off operates here: eve-
rything capable of having a bearing has to be given the weight, 
great or little, due to it. 154 
By way of endorsing the lower court's method of analysis, Brooke 
L.J. observed in Karanakaran: 
What [the tribunal in Kaja] 155 decided was that when assessing 
future risk decisionmakers may have· to take into account a 
whole bundle of disparate pieces of evidence: (1) evidence they 
are certain about; (2) evidence they think is probably true; 
154. Karanakaran v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] 3 All E.R. 449, 479 (C.A. 
2000) (Sedley, L.J.) (Eng.). 
155. Kaja v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1995] Imm. A.R. 1 (lmmigr. App. Trib. 
1994) (U.K.). 
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(3) evidence to which they are willing to attach some credence, 
even if they could not go so far as to say it is probably true; 
( 4) evidence to which they are not willing to attach any credence 
at all. '56 
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This understanding is firmly in line with the general approach to 
evidence adopted across common law jurisdictions. For example, the 
·U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence state that "[a]ll relevant evidence is ad-
missible."157 "Relevant" evidence is defined as "[e]vidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable that it would 
be without the evidence."158 The Australian approach is similar, with the 
Evidence Act 1995 codifying the position that "[e]vidence that is rele-
vant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally 
affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the ex-
istence of a fact in issue in the proceeding .... [E]vidence that is relevant 
in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding."159 The approach of the 
United Kingdom is analogous: 
[E]vidence is that which may be placed before the court in order 
that it may decide the issues of fact. ... [T]he facts which may 
be proved in a judicial inquiry are facts in issue and facts rele-
vant to the issue, and any facts, whether relevant to tfie issue or 
not, which affect the legal reception or weight of the evidence 
tendered. [Facts relevant to the issue] ... are facts which tend, 
either directly or indirectly, to prove or disprove a fact in issue. 160 
This basic principle is likewise reflected in Canadian law, where "[a] 
fact will be relevant not only where it relates directly to the fact in issue, 
but also where it proves or renders probable the past, present or future 
existence (or non-existence) of any fact in issue."161 Because these 
156. Karanakaran v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] 3 All E.R. 449, 459 (C.A. 
2000) (Brooke, L.J.) (Eng.). This paper does not consider the argument that evidence that has 
no credence should be considered admissible. 
157. FED. R. EVID. 402. 
158. Id. at 401. 
159. Evidence Act, 1995, §§ 55-56 (Aust!.). 
160. L.C. PHIPSON, PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE§§ l.03, 6.0'1, 6.03 (M.N. Howard et al. eds., 
15th ed. 2000). See also RUTH CANNON & NIALL NELIGAN, EVIDENCE I (2002) ("An item of 
evidence may be defined as something that tends to prove or disprove a particular fact, in the 
sense that it makes the existence or non-existence of that fact more likely. An alternative defi-
nition of evidence describes it as information that may be used to help prove or disprove the 
truth or existence of some matter in legal proceedings."). 
161. JOHN SOPINKA ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CANADA 24 (1992). See also 
JAMES C. MORTON, POCKET GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 4 (2d ed. 2002) (citing R. v. Arp, [1998] 3 
S.C.R. 339, ')[ 38 (Can. 1998) ("The basic rule is that all relevant evidence is admissible. Rele-
vance depends directly on the facts in issue in any particular case ... The evidence must 
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general principles of evidence are logically applied to refugee law, it is 
clear that-even without a subjective element-evidence adduced by the 
applicant must be considered (along with all other probative evidence) in 
an analysis of the forward-looking risk of being persecuted. 162 
Not only is a subjective element unnecessary to secure the substan-
tive admissibility of evidence adduced by the applicant, but there is a 
real concern that continued reference to "subjective" and "objective" 
evidence may actually interfere with the duty of decisionmakers to de-
vote equivalent attention to all forms of evidence, regardless of their 
origin, 163 and to accord weight to each piece of evidence based only on 
its probative worth. Properly understood, evidence adduced by the appli-
cant and evidence from "more objective" sources are different in kind, 
but not in quality. Yet, the classification of evidence as subjective or ob-
jective based on its source creates de facto an evidentiary hierarchy 
under which decisionmakers may be led to overvalue "objective" evi-
dence and devalue evidence labeled "subjective." 
Fundamentally, "objective" and "subjective" are not neutral adjec-
tives used merely as a matter of convenience. 164 This is obvious even 
simply tend to 'increase or diminish the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.' ... As a 
consequence, there is no minimum probative value required for evidence to be relevant."). 
162. The New Zealand approach to well-founded fear is illustrative. In 1996, that jurisdic-
tion adopted an approach solely concerned with risk under which subjective fear is not required 
and no other substantive role is accorded to a subjective element. Even without a subjective ele-
ment, New Zealand decisionrnakers routinely consider all information probative of the risk of 
being persecuted. Moreover, under the New Zealand Immigration Act, it is irrelevant to the issue 
of admissibility whether evidence is adduced by the applicant in the form of oral testimony or 
documents, or whether it comes from more "independent" sources such as NGO or govern-
ment reports concerning country conditions: 
For the purpose of determining a claim [for refugee status], an officer-
( a) May seek information from any source; but 
(b) Is not obliged to seek any information, evidence, or submissions further to that 
provided by the claimant; and 
(c) May determine the claim on the basis of the information, evidence, and submis-
sions provided by the claimant. 
New Zealand Immigration Act, 1987, § 129(G)(6) (N.Z.). 
163. For instance, the High Court of Australia in Wu Shan Liang acknowledged that "the 
decision-maker must not, by a process of factual findings on particular elements of the mate-
rial which is provided, foreclose reasonable speculation upon the chances of persecution 
emerging from a consideration of the whole of the material." Minister for Immigr. and Ethnic 
Aff. v. Wu Shan Liang, [1996] 136 A.LR. 481, 507 (Austl. 1996) (Kirby, J.). 
164. "The Western legal tradition sees the world in dichotomous terms, such as: ra-
tional/irrational; thought/feeling; objectivity/subjectivity; abstract thinking/contextual thinking. 
Law adopts this dualism, and in each of these cases it gives preference to the former over the 
latter. In other words, 'the rational, the intellectual, the objective and the abstract decision is the 
preferred and superior style of decision making.'" LocATING LAW: RAcE/CLAss!GENDER CON-
NECTIONS 24 (Elizabeth Cormack ed., 1999) (citing NGAIRE NAFFINE, LAW AND THE SEXES: 
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from a strictly linguistic perspective. "Objective" is defined as "external 
to the mind; real." 165 The word "subjective," by contrast, is defined as 
"existing in the mind only; ... illusory, fanciful." 166 If there is truly a 
meaningful distinction between evidence labeled as "objective" and evi-
dence labeled as "subjective," it must be because the former is, by 
nature, more rational, more reliable, and more probative than the latter. It 
would therefore be understandable that the legal mind might be inclined 
to prefer the "objective" over the "subjective." Yet it surely follows that 
the result of a decision to classify evidence adduced by applicants for 
refugee status as "subjective" is that it is unlikely to receive the weight 
due it on the basis of a non-categorical appraisal of its probative worth. 
B. Taking the Applicant's Evidence Seriously 
To say that all evidence, regardless of its source, is entitled to be 
considered based on its actual probative worth is not, of course, to say 
that every piece of evidence must be accorded the same weight in the 
assessment of actual risk. The English Court of Appeal, in Karanakaran, 
clarified that "[w]hat the decision-makers ultimately make of the mate-
rial is a matter for their own conscientious judgment, so long as the 
procedure by which they approach and entertain it is lawful and fair, and 
provided their decision logically addresses the Convention issues."167 In 
contrast, the second variant of a (non-fear-based) subjective element 
suggests that it is appropriate for an applicant's credible testimony not 
only to be taken into account, but actually to be treated as a stronger or 
more reliable form of evidence. 
In part, this approach raises the same concerns just addressed. While 
the intent here is to advantage the evidence adduced by refugees by means 
of a categorical distinction that favors their evidence, it is still a formalist, 
categorical distinction not predicated on a qualitative assessment of the 
actual probative worth of the evidence. As such, it runs afoul of the duty of 
decisionmakers to give equal attention to all forms of admissible 
EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 26 (1990)). See also ROY L. BROOKS, STRUC-
TURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING FROM LEGAL FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 31 
(2002) ("[Max] Weber believed that highly evolved legal systems are in this sense "rational" 
rather than "irrational". They are, in other words, legal systems with value-free judicial proc-
esses."); ANDREI MARMOR, POSITIVE LAW AND OBJECTIVE VALUES 147(2001) ("One of 
Marx's main insights about the law is the twofold claim that the law must present itself as an 
objective, unbiased arbitrator of disputes and that it systematically fails to meet this challenge. 
According to Marx and later Marxists, law's claim to objectivity in this respect is one of its 
main ideological aspects"). 
165. IO OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 643. 
166. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 33. 
167. Karanakaran v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (2000] 3 All E.R. 449, 477 (C.A. 
2000) (Sedley, L.J.) (Eng.). 
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evidence, and to assign weight based solely on their "conscientious 
judgment" of the relative value of each item of evidence to the overall 
assessment of risk. ·· 
Advocacy of this variant of the subjective element thesis is likely 
rooted in a desire to overcome what may be thought to be the predisposi-
tion of some decisionmakers to give short shrift to claims in which the 
applicant's testimony constitutes most or all of the evidence of risk. A 
clear answer has already emerged in the jurisprudence, however, and, in 
some cases, codified laws of state parties: it is now generally recognized 
that an applicant's credible oral testimony may constitute the whole of 
the evidence in support of his or her claim.168 Canadian courts, for in-
stance, recognize that by swearing to the truth of her statements, the 
applicant creates "a presumption that [her] allegations are true unless 
there be reason to doubt their truthfulness." 169 Similarly, New Zealand 
refugee decisionmakers do not require external corroboration if the ap-
plicant's testimony is plausible, credible and frank. 110 U.S. Immigration 
Regulations state that "the testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be 
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration,"111 a posi-
tion which has led the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals repeatedly to 
assert the duty to consider whether an applicant's "credible testimony 
alone [is] sufficient to establish her eligibility for asylum and/or with-
holding removal." 172 In view of such clear affirmations of the real value 
of an applicant's testimonial evidence, it is difficult to understand the 
propriety of going farther still to insist that a subjective element is 
needed in order to ensure that such evidence effectively trumps other 
evidence adduced. In some cases, official or non-governmental reports 
on human rights conditions may be more probative of an applicant's risk 
than information supplied by the applicant, if only because the appli-
cant's range of experience or depth of knowledge provides only a partial 
picture of overall risk. 173 Similarly, an applicant's evidence of what has 
168. HATHAWAY, supra note 7, at 84. 
169. Sathanandan v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), No. A-645-90, 'JI 3 
(Fed. Ct. App. 1991) (Mahoney, J.) (Can.) (quoting Moldonado v. Can. (Minister of Employ-
ment and Immigr.), [1980] 2 F.C. 302, 305 (Fed. Ct. App. 1979) (Can.)). 
170. In Refugee Appeal No. 265192, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority acknowledged 
that it is unreasonable "to attack [an applicant's] credibility on the basis that documentary 
evidence in support of the claim [is not] produced." The Authority further held: "[C]learly 
there must be valid reasons to doubt the credibility of an applicant and there is no requirement 
that testimony which is plausible, credible and frank must be supported by external corrobora-
tion." Refugee Appeal No. 265/92, Re SA (Refugee Status Appeals Auth.) (Haines, Deputy 
Chair) (N.Z.). 
171. U.S. Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2005). 
172. Abdule v. Ashcroft, 47 Fed. Appx. 463, 465 (9th Cir. 2002). 
173. In Dudar v. Canada, for instance, the Federal Court of Canada rightly held that "[i]t 
was open to the Board to prefer the documentary evidence over that of the Applicant," so long 
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occurred to him or her will logically be of less value than general human 
rights data where the issue in a case is whether conditions in the appli-
cant's country of origin have changed since his or her departure, such 
that a risk that was once clearly well-founded may presently be unsub-
stantiated.174 
C. Attention to Particular Susceptibilities 
A subjective element has also been said to be necessary in order to 
enable decisionmakers to take account of particularized vulnerabilities 
(both physical and psychological) that may result in a given applicant 
experiencing more severe harm than other persons subject to the same 
objective circumstances. In our view, such concerns are relevant, but not 
normally pertinent to the well-founded fear inquiry. Rather, evidence of 
an applicant's susceptibility to increased harm is appropriately consid-
ered as part of the analysis of whether the substantive harm feared 
amounts to a risk of "being persecuted." In contrast to the well-founded 
fear determination, which essentially speaks to the degree of risk, the 
evaluation of whether the harm is or is not persecutory is oriented pre-
cisely to the ascertainment and evaluation of the impact of a given act or 
threat of action on the well-being of the applicant. 
In this section, we elaborate our position that an analysis of "being 
persecuted" grounded in international human rights law allows 
decisionmakers fully and adequately to take account of particularized risks 
of harm, without any need for a subjective element. International human 
rights law recognizes that individuals facing the same external 
phenomenon may experience harm differently, and thus may be 
differentially at risk of being persecuted because of their unique 
characteristics. In particular, international human rights law's recognition 
that extreme forms of psychological harm amount to "cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment" allows such harms to be classified as forms of 
persecution. There is therefore no need to invoke a fungible subjective 
element to do justice to the protection needs of persons at risk of such 
forms of harm. 
Refugee law emerged from, and is situated within, the broader con-
text of international human rights law. As much is clear from the 
as it gave clear reasons why it had chosen to do so. Dudar v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigr.), [2002] F.C.T. 1277, 'lI 20 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 2002) (Snider, J.) (Can.). 
174. ''A judgment must be made as to what may happen in the future, including any 
change in current circumstances .... There may be no current risk of persecution on a Refu-
gees Convention ground, yet a change in circumstances may readily be foreseen that would 
create a significant risk of persecution on such a ground." Minister for lmmigr. & Multicultu-
ral Aff. v. Jama, [1999] F.C.A. 1680, 'lI 24 (Full Fed. Ct. 1999) (Branson & Sackville, JJ.) 
(Aust!.). 
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Preamble to the Refugee Convention, which constitutes a key part of the 
treaty's context to be taken into account in its interpretation: 175 
Considering that the Charter of the United Nations and the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 
1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the principle that 
human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms 
without discrimination; Considering that the United Nations has, 
on various occasions manifested its profound concern for refu-
gees and endeavored to assure refugees the widest possible 
exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms . . . Have 
agreed as follows ... 176 
Indeed, the House of Lords expressly relied on the Refugee Conven-
tion's Preamble to determine that when assessing the viability of a 
refugee applicant's claim, it is crucial that the international human rights 
context frames the process. After quoting the first four sections of the 
preamble of the Refugee Convention, Lord Steyn wrote in the leading 
case of Shah and Islam that: 
The relevance of the preambles is twofold. First, they expressly 
show that a premise of the Convention was that all human beings 
shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms. Secondly, and 
more pertinently, they show that counteracting discrimination, 
which is referred to in the first preamble, was a fundamental 
purpose of the convention. That is reinforced by the reference in 
the first preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
177 
Leading refugee jurisprudence of other states confirms the centrality 
of international human rights law to an authentic understanding of refu-
gee law. In one of the earliest formulations, the Supreme Court of 
Canada held in its seminal decision of Ward that "[u]nderlying the Con-
vention is the international community's commitment to the assurance of 
175. "An obvious internal source of reference is the preamble to the treaty. The preamble 
is a principal and natural source from which indications can be gathered of a treaty's objects 
and purposes even though the preamble does not contain substantive provisions. Article 31(2) 
of the Vienna Convention sets this out specifically ... [and] this Court ... has made substan-
tial use of it for interpretational purposes." Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. 
Senegal), 1991 I.C.J. 53, 142 (Mar. 2, 1990) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). The decisions cited 
in which the International Court of Justice has relied upon the preamble to a treaty for inter-
pretive purposes include: Rights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 
1952 l.C.J. 176, 196 (Aug. 27); and Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru) 1950 l.C.J. 266, 282 (Nov. 
20). 
176. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, Preamble. 
177. R v. lmmigr. App. Trib., Ex parte Shah, [ 1999] 2 All E.R. 545, 551 (H.L. 1999) 
(Steyn, L.) (U.K.). 
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basic human rights without discrimination."178 Similarly, Gleeson, C.J., 
of the High Court of Australia has also affirmed that refugee law must be 
interpreted within the broader context of international human rights law, 
stating: 
The purpose and content [of the Convention] can, in tum, only 
be understood by reference to the history and broad humanitarian 
object of the Convention .... [I]ts meaning should be ascertained 
having regard to its object, bearing in mind that the Convention is 
one of several important international treaties designed to redress 
"violation[s] of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of 
• ,,179 state protecuon. 
In practice, the anchoring of refugee law in the human rights context 
has proved particularly valuable in facilitating an evolving understanding 
of the core construct of a risk of "being persecuted."180 In the Ward deci-
sion, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada observed that 
"'[p]ersecution' ... undefined in the Convention, has been ascribed the 
meaning of 'sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights de-
monstrative of a failure of state protection.' " 181 Lord Bingham recently 
observed in the House of Lords that the concept of persecution must be 
understood within the greater context of international human rights, spe-
cifically that "it is necessary to investigate whether the treatment which 
the applicants reasonably fear would infringe a recognized human 
right." 182 The new European Union Qualification Directive similarly de-
fines a risk of being persecuted as involving the risk of acts which are 
178. Ward v. Attorney General, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 'll 7l(Can. 1993) (La Forest, J.). 
179. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff. v. Khawar, [2002] 67 A.L.D. 577, 'll 111 
(Aust!. 2002) (quoting HATHAWAY, supra note 7, at 104-105). 
180. For example, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have 
all produced guidelines that advance the notion that the interpretation of gender-based perse-
cution in refugee law should be informed by fundamental human rights. See Deborah E. 
Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133, 
139 (2002). See also Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Refugee 
and Humanitarian Visa Applicants: Guidelines on Gender Issues for Decision Makers (July 
1996), available at http://refugeelawreader.org/files/pdf/172.pdf; Canadian Immigration and 
Refugee Board, Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution 
(updated Nov. 13, 1996), available at http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/about/guidelines/ 
women_e.htm; Nathalia Berkowitz & Catriona Jarvis, Immigration Appellate Authority: Asy-
lum Gender Guidelines (Nov. 2000), available at www.iaa.gov.uk/gender.pdf; Memorandum 
from Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, Considerations For Asylum Officers Adju-
dicating Asylum Claims From Women (May 26, 1995), available at http:// 
sierra.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/guidelines/us.pdf. 
181. Ward v. Attorney General, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 'JI 72(Can. 1993) (La Forest, J.) 
(quoting HATHAWAY, supra note 7, at 104-05). 
182. Sepet v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2003] 3 All E.R. 304, 312 (H.L. 2003) 
(Bingham, L.) (U.K.). 
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"sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to constitute a severe 
violation of basic human rights, in particular the rights from which dero-
gation cannot be made." 183 And in a particularly thoughtful passage, 
Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia recently reversed his own 
position on the meaning of "being persecuted" to come into line with the 
international trend to ground determinations of persecution in the norms 
of human rights law: 
I am now inclined to see more clearly than before the dangers in 
the use of dictionary definitions of the word 'persecuted' in the 
Convention definition .... Dictionary definitions can ... incor-
rectly direct the mind of the decisionmaker to the intention of 
the persecutor instead of to the effect on the persecuted .... 
. . . [The Refugee Convention's] meaning should be ascertained 
having regard to its object, bearing in mind that the Convention 
is one of several important international treaties designed to re-
dress 'violation[s] of basic human rights, demonstrative of a 
failure of state protection.' It is the recognition of the failure of 
state protection, so often repeated in the history of the past hun-
dred years, that led to the exceptional involvement of 
international law in matters concerning individual human 
. h 184 ng ts. 
While international human rights law is fundamentally concerned to 
set common, universally applicable norms, the General Comments 
adopted by United Nations human rights treaty bodies make clear that 
the assessment of compliance with human rights obligations must take 
account of the unique situations of all, in particular of those who are 
most vulnerable. 185 For example, the United Nations Human Rights 
183. Council Directive 2004/83/EC on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and 
Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Other-
wise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, art. 9(l}(a), 
2004 OJ. (L 304) 12 [hereinafter Council Directive on Minimum Standards]. 
184. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff. v. Khawar, [2002) H.C.A. 14 (Aust!. 
2002) (Kirby, J.) (citations omitted). 
185. Vulnerable groups such as women, children, older persons, people with disabilities, 
religious, ethnic, and cultural minorities, accused and incarcerated individuals, indigenous 
people, and non-citizens often face particular and unique obstacles that can thwart their en-
joyment of fundamental human rights. In their respective recommendations, the U.N. 
supervisory bodies suggest specific remedies and programs that are tailored to address various 
groups' specific vulnerabilities. It can be extrapolated from this approach that the protection of 
universal human rights does not entail identical treatment, nor is the infringement of human 
rights assessed without consideration of the identity of the complainant. The human rights 
treaty bodies consist of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Human 
Rights Committee; the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Commit-
Winter 2005] Convention's Requirement of "Well-Founded Fear" 555 
Committee has affirmed that in order to assess whether particular actions 
violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Civil 
and Political Covenant), one must examine "all circumstances of the 
case such as the duration and manner of the treatment, its physical or 
mental effects as well as the sex, age and state of health of the victim 
(emphasis added)."186 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination has similarly emphasized that racial discrimination can 
manifest itself in unique ways depending on the identity of the 
complainant, and, in particular, on his or her gender: 
There are circumstances in which racial discrimination only or 
primarily affects women, or affects women in a different way, or 
to a different degree than men. Such racial discrimination will 
often escape detection if there is no explicit recognition or ac-
knowledgment of the different life experiences of women and 
men, in areas of both public and private life. 187 
A similar attentiveness to the ways in which particular characteristics 
can affect the question of whether human rights are violated can be seen 
at the regional level. The European Court of Human Rights has deter-
mined that consideration of whether there has been a violation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights requires consideration of "the 
age, sex, and health condition of the person exposed to [the treat-
ment]."188 In a precedent-setting decision, Zekia J. expounded on this 
notion by giving an example that dramatically illustrates the relevance of 
individuated vulnerabilities in determining the existence of a human 
rights violation: 
I can ref er to the case of an elderly sick .man who is exposed to a 
harsh treatment-after being given several blows and beaten to 
the floor, is dragged and kicked on the floor for several hours. I 
would say without hesitation that the poor man has been tor-
tured. If such treatment is applied on a wrestler or even a young 
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; the Committee against Torture; and 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
186. Vuolanne v. Finland, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, para-
graph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(thirty fifth session) concerning Communication No. 26511987, at 'I[ 9.2, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/35/D/265/1987 (1989) (emphasis added). 
187. Gender-Related Dimensions of Racial Oiscrimination, General Recommendation 
XXV, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 56th sess. at 152, U.N. Doc. 
N55/18 (2000). 
188. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 109 (1978) (Zekia, J.). 
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athlete, I would hesitate a lot to describe it as an inhuman treat-
ment and I might regard it as a mere rough handling. 189 
This approach has been imported into refugee law. The European 
Union, for example, has determined that 
[i]n assessing an applicant's fear of being persecuted or exposed 
to other serious and unjustified harm, Member States shall take 
into account . . . the individual position and personal circum-
stances of the applicant, including factors such as background, 
gender, age, health and disabilities so as to assess the serious-
f . h 190 ness o persecut10n or arm. 
The duty to consider particularized impact in assessing refugee 
status is moreover anchored in the Convention's language, which speaks 
to a well-founded fear of "being persecuted," in the passive voice. As 
Heerey J. of the Australian Federal Court has noted: 
The use of the passive voice conveys a compound notion, con-
cerned both with the conduct of the persecutor and the effect that 
conduct has on the person being persecuted. In assessing the 
probable impact of a persecutor's conduct, decisionmakers can 
readily consider an applicant's unique characteristics-such as 
age, health, disability, or past experience-that render him or her 
especially vulnerable to being persecuted. 191 
Of particular relevance to the present discussion, a human rights-
based approach to "being persecuted" allows for consideration of an ap-
plicant's psychological vulnerabilities. Indeed, international human 
rights law recognizes that psychological harm, if sufficiently severe, can 
amount to a human rights violation. Article 5 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights decrees that "no one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."192 This dec-
laration is codified in binding terms in the Civil and Political Covenant, 
Article 7 of which provides that "no one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."193 In its Gen-
eral Comment on Article 7, the Human Rights Committee makes clear 
that "[t]he prohibition in Article 7 relates not only to acts that cause 
189. Id. 
190. Council Directive on Minimum Standards, supra note 183, art. 10(2). 
191. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural and Indigenous Aff. v. Kord, [2002] 125 
F.C.R. 68, 69 (Full Fed. Ct. 2002) (Heerey, J.) (Aust!.). 
192. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
193. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
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physical pain, but also to acts that cause mental suffering to the vic-
tim."194 
In applying this standard, the Committee has determined, for exam-
ple, that the mental suffering caused by the mysterious disappearance of 
her daughter violated the mother's human rights: 
[There was] anguish and stress caused to the mother by the dis-
appearance of her daughter and by the continuing uncertainty 
concerning her fate and whereabouts: The author has the right to 
know what has happened to her daughter. In these respects, she 
too is a victim of the violations of the Covenant suffered by her 
daughter in particular, of article 7 .195 
Similarly, the Human Rights Committee has found that when a state 
abducts someone and refuses to provide any information or allow any 
outside contact with the abducted person for an inordinate amount of 
time, "the removal of the victim and the prevention of contact with his 
family and with the outside world constitute cruel and inhuman treat-
ment, in violation of article 7 of the Covenant."196 Cruel and inhuman 
treatment thus encompasses extreme psychological pain, regardless of 
whether physical injury was sustained. 
Interpreting the notion of "being persecuted" as involving serious 
harm which is in breach of international human rights law should there-
fore result in the recognition of cases in which there is a forward-looking 
expectation of subjection to serious psychological harm, assuming of 
course that this is for a Convention reason and that the state of origin 
will not or cannot be relied upon to counter the risk. As the caselaw on 
point demonstrates, there is no need to rely on a "subjective element" to 
achieve this goal. In Katrinak, for example, the English Court of Appeal 
considered the claim of a Roma man who had been attacked and injured 
by skinheads, as had his visibly pregnant wife in a separate attack. 
Schiemann L.J., in considering the question of whether the man had suf-
fered persecution (additional to his own injuries) because of the attack 
on his wife, observed that 
194. General Comment 20, Article 7, U.N. Human Rights Committee, reprinted in Com-
pilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies at 129, 5, U.N. Doc. HRI/GENl/Rev.7 (2004). 
195. Quinteros Almeida v. Uruguay, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 
5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (nineteenth session) concerning Communication No. 10711981, at 'II 14, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981 (1981). 
196. N'goya v. Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo), Views of the Human Rights 
Committee under article 5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (fifty-sixth session) concerning Communication No 
54211993, at 'II 5.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/542/1993 (1993). 
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the attacks also potentially evidence the appellants' vulnerability 
in the future. An activity which would not amount to persecution 
if done to some people may amount to persecution if done to 
others. It is easier to persecute a husband whose wife has been 
kicked in a racial attack whilst visibly pregnant than one whose 
family has not had this experience. What to others may be an 
unbelievable threat may induce terror in such a man. 197 
The judgment further observed that 
[i]t is possible to persecute a husband or a member of a family 
by what you do to other members of his immediate family. The 
essential task for the decision taker in these sort of circum-
stances is to consider what is reasonably likely to happen to the 
wife and whether that is reasonably likely to affect the husband 
in such a way as to amount to persecution of him. 198 
Similarly, the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals in Y-T-L held that 
the infliction of a forced sterilization on one spouse may amount to past 
persecution of the other spouse. 199 While the majority finding does not 
elucidate the basis for this finding, the dissent thoughtfully suggested 
that "such persecution must be personal to the applicant, although the 
harm to the persecuted individual may also result in grievous harm to the 
applicant ... [for example] the loss of consortium of his spouse (includ-
ing the opportunity to have children)."200 Under this analysis, a loss of 
consortium can be seen as a psychological harm amounting to persecu-
tion directly experienced by the applicant. 
Most recently, the view that the risk of serious psychological harm 
can be a form of persecution has been affirmed by the Federal Court of 
Australia in SCAT, a case involving a family who were members of the 
Sabean Mandean religious minority in Iran. The court observed that 
"[i]nsofar as psychological harm to the appellant's family members, 
rather than directly to himself, might have been in issue, that could 
plainly be taken into account as an element of harm to the appellant him-
self. To harm a child may also be to harm its custodial parents."201 Thus, 
in line with the approach taken in international human rights law gener-
ally, there is clear support in refugee jurisprudence for the view that 
severe psychological harm, even if experienced as the indirect conse-
197. Katrinak v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2001] E.W.C.A. Civ. 832, 'JI 21 
(C.A. 2001) (Shiemann, L.J.) (Eng.). 
198. Id. 'JI 23. 
199. In reY-T-L, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601 (B.I.A. 2003). 
200. Id. 
201. SCAT v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural and Indigenous Aff., [2003] F.C.A. 
80, 'JI 23 (Full Fed. Ct. 2003) (Madgwick & Conti, JJ.) (Aust!.). 
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quence of harm done to others, is a form of serious harm amounting to 
persecution. 
The psychological impact of threats of violence and murder has also 
been considered in refugee law. While threats alone are rarely found to 
be extreme enough to constitute persecution, in the case of Ramos-Ortiz 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit acknowledged that ex-
treme and plausible threats may, in and of themselves, amount to 
persecution. In that case, a thirty-one year old man from Guatemala al-
leged that he was threatened with death if he refused to join the 
guerrillas in their fight against the government. Rather than risk this fate, 
he fled to the United States. The court stated in obiter dicta that 
"[t]hreats alone are generally not sufficient to constitute past persecu-
tion; instead, only those threats that are so menacing in themselves that 
they cause significant actual suffering or harm rise to the level of perse-
cution."202 The implication is therefore that where death threats are 
sufficiently terrorizing that they cause genuine and extreme mental suf-
fering, they may fall within the ambit of persecution. 
The intangible, but acute, psychological harm of discrimination has 
been similarly recognized by refugee jurisprudence as amounting to per-
secution if it is extreme enough. This question was considered in the 
previously cited case of SCAT. The discriminatory treatment experienced 
by the Sabean Mandean minority included the denial of the right to han-
dle food, prejudicial insults, deprivation of physical contact in greetings, 
exclusion from clubs, denigration of their religion, and the possibility of 
forced marriage for the women with Muslim men. The consequences of 
such lifelong treatment involved feelings of insecurity and lack of con-
trol over one's life that created a grave risk of suicide. The Federal Court 
of Australia found that when discrimination is extreme and relentless 
from childhood, "the cumulative effect of this was likely to entail severe 
psychological harm"203 sufficient to give rise to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted. 
In sum, refugee law-in line with the principles of international hu-
man rights law, which comprise part of its legal context-recognizes 
both that the analysis of the gravity of harm risked by an applicant must 
take account of his or her particular susceptibilities, and also that serious 
forms of psychological harm may, in and of themselves, be forms of per-
secution. In light of these critical developments, there is today no need to 
202. Ramos-Ortiz v. Ashcroft, 70 Fed. Appx. 68, 71 (3rd Cir. 2003). See also Navas v. 
INS, 217 F.3d 646, 658 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[D]eath threats alone can constitute persecution."). 
203. SCAT v. Minister for lmmigr. and Multicultural and Indigenous Aff., [2003] F.C.A. 
80, 'j[ 23 (Full Fed. Ct. 2003) (Austl.). 
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advocate a subjective element in "well-founded fear" in order to embrace 
concerns of this kind as part of the refugee status inquiry. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The subjective element of the duty to show a "well-founded fear" of 
being persecuted is both widely accepted and widely misunderstood. 
Conceptual and linguistic confusion has resulted in a range of specific 
understandings that is breathtaking in its diversity. While the initial im-
petus to posit such a requirement may well have been to mandate clear 
attention to each individual refugee claimant's case, or to ensure that his 
or specific susceptibilities be taken into account in determining whether 
a sufficiently grave risk might accrue upon return, normative develop-
ments in refugee law have rendered each of these goals superfluous. In 
particular, an applicant's evidence-including his or her own credible 
testimony-is now understood to be at the center of the refugee status 
inquiry, and to be a sufficient basis for the recognition of refugee status, 
at least where corroboration is not reasonably available. The clear em-
brace of a human rights-based approach to the interpretation of the core 
construct of a risk of "being persecuted" has moreover facilitated reli-
ance on the risk of claimant-specific harms, including those of a 
psychological nature, as legitimate grounds for the recognition of refu-
gee status. If these were the reasons for traditional insistence on a 
subjective element, the requirement may today be considered essentially 
an anachronism. 
But in fact, the dominant understanding of the subjective element is 
not nearly so benign. To the contrary, the usual approach is to insist that 
even clearly at-risk claimants must also demonstrate their subjective 
trepidation in order to be granted refugee status. As we have shown, this 
requirement results in the denial of international protection to a variety 
of applicants who, by reason of their age, mental health, stoic nature, 
gender, or culture are unable either to experience or effectively to com-
municate their subjective fear to the decisionmaker. The various efforts 
to compensate for the clear dangers of insistence on the demonstration of 
subjective fear are partial, and difficult to apply with accuracy. In par-
ticular, the several objective indicators relied upon as surrogates for the 
existence of subjective trepidation are in most cases of doubtful rele-
vance to the existence of fear, and in some instances lead to results 
which contradict established principles of refugee law. In the end, there 
is now clear evidence that applicants well within the class of persons 
intended to the benefit from the Refugee Convention are, in practice, 
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denied status as refugees by reason of the duty to show their subjective 
fear. 
This, then, brings us back to the fundamental question of why one 
might persist in asserting a bipartite understanding of the well-founded 
fear standard instead of recognizing-as we advocate here-that the 
standard requires only evidence of a forward-looking expectation of ac-
tual risk. 
In part, the answer seems simply to be that the word "fear" is most 
commonly used to refer to trepidation. Yet as we have shown, an under-
standing of "fear" (and of the equally authoritative French language 
notion of "craindre") that connotes forward-looking apprehension is 
squarely within the accepted ordinary meaning of those terms. This more 
objective understanding is moreover compelled by rules of treaty inter-
pretation, because it both facilitates an application which coincides much 
more closely with dominant practice in Francophone jurisdictions and 
supports the underlying goals of the Refugee Convention itself. 
Beyond the literal explanation, the primary reason for maintenance 
of a two-part understanding of "well-founded fear" seems to be little 
more than habit. The bifurcated position has been adopted, at least for-
mally, in most UNHCR position papers and in the jurisprudence of 
leading courts. While the breadth and depth of the attachment to the bi-
furcated position is no small obstacle, we believe that the increasingly 
clear evidence of the serious harm it does to genuinely at-risk persons 
compels a fundamental reconsideration of the established view. 
There is, in fact, no textual or principled impediment to adoption of an 
understanding of "well-founded fear" focused exclusively on forward-
looking apprehension; to the contrary, it is a view that is fully supported 
by language and by the context, object, and purpose of the Refugee Con-
vention. There is moreover no evidence whatsoever that a move in this 
direction poses any downside risk for refugees-as practice in New Zea-
land, which has rejected any duty to show subjective fear or trepidation, 
and adopted an understanding of "well-founded fear" focused exclusively 
on prospective apprehension, makes clear.204 This result is not surprising, 
as the interpretation advanced in this Article merely eliminates one of 
204. In 1996, New Zealand formally disavowed the existence of a subjective element in 
well-founded fear. The present standard, which focuses exclusively on the applicant's actual 
risk, has been formulated as follows: "On the facts as found by the decision-maker: l. Objec-
tively, is there a real chance of the refugee claimant being persecuted if returned to the country 
of nationality? 2. If the answer is Yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution?" 
Refugee Appeal No. 70074/96, Re ELLM (Refugee Status Appeals Auth. 1996) (N.Z.). 
By adopting this test, New Zealand courts have effectively simplified the analysis of 
well-founded fear without sacrificing the ability to personalize the inquiry into risk or take 
account of particular susceptibilities. 
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what are now said to be two essential elements of the well-founded fear 
test, rather than imposing a new or more exacting test. 
The challenge, then, is to move beyond routinized deference to tradi-
tion in order to eliminate a clear and present danger to the ability of the 
Refugee Convention to serve its core purpose of protecting at-risk per-
sons from being persecuted. Whether a person is, or is not, subjectively 
fearful of return to actual risk should be recognized as legally immate-
rial. 
